The following article is transcribed from the New York Times, dated November 12, 1862:

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The Commission, consisting of Maj.-Gen. D. HUNTER. U.S.A. of Vols., President; Major-Gen. G. Cadwalader, U.S.A. of Vols.; Brig.-Gen. C.C. Augur, U.S.A. of Vols.; Major Donn Piatt, A.A.G. of Vols.; Capt. F. Ball, A.D.C. of Vols., Col. G. Holt, Judge-Advocate General, called by the Government to investigate the conductor certain officers connected with, and the circumstances attending the the abandonment of Maryland Heights and the surrender of Harper's Ferry, have the honor to report the following: On the 3d or September, Gen. WHITE entered Harper's Ferry with his force from Winchester. The text day he was ordered to Martinsburgh, to take command of the forces there. On the 12th of September he again returned to Harper's Ferry, where he remained until the surrender, without assuming the command. On the 7th of September, Gen. MCCLELLAN, the most of his forces having preceded him, left Washington under orders issued some days previously, to drive the enemy from Maryland. That night he established his headquarters at Rockville, from which place, on the 11th of September, he telegraphed to Gen. HALLECK to have Col. MILES ordered to join him at once. On the 5th of September Col. THOMAS H. FORD, Thirty-second Ohio, took command of the forces on Maryland Heights. Forces were placed at Solomon's Gap and at Sandy Hook. Those at Sandy Hook, under Col. MAULSBY, retired by Col. MILES' order to the eastern slope of Maryland Heights, two or three days previous to their evacuation by Col. FORD. On the 11th of September the force at Solomon's Gap was driven in by the enemy. Col. FORD called upon Col. MILES for reinforcements. The One Hundred and Twenty-sixth New-York and the Thirty ninth New-York (Garibaldi Guards) were sent him on Friday, the 12th of September, and on the morning of the 13th he was further reinforced by the One Hundred and Fifteenth New-York and a portion of a Maryland regiment under Lieut.-Col. DOWNEY. Col. FORD made requisition for axes and spades to enable him to construct defences on the Heights, but obtained none, With ten axes belonging to some Maryland troops, hiring all that could be obtained, a slight breastwork of trees was constructed, on the 12th near the crest of the Heights, and a slashing of timber made for a short distance in front of the breast-work. The forces under Col. FORD were stationed at various points on Maryland Heights, the principal force being on the crest of the hill near the breastwork and look-out. Skirmishing commenced on Friday, the 12th, on the crest of the hill. Early on the morning of the 13th, the enemy made an attack on the crest of the hill, and after some time, the troops retired in some confusion to the breastwork, where they were rallied. About 9 o'clock, a second attack was made, which the troops behind the breastwork resisted for a short time, and until Col. SHERRILL, of the Twelfth New-York, was wounded, and carried off the field, when the entire One Hundred and twenty-sixth Regiment, as some witnesses testify, all but two companies, Major HEWITT states, broke and fled in utter confusion. Men and most of the officers all fled together, no effert being made to rally the regiment, except by Col. FORD, Lieut. BARRAS, Acting-Adjutant, and some officers of other regiments, directed by Col. MILES, then on the Heights. Soon after, the remaining forces at the breastwork fell back, under a supposed order from Major HEWITT, who himself says that he gave no such order; merely sent instructions to the Captains of his own regiment that, if they were compelled to retire, to do so in good order. Orders were given by Col. FORD for the troops to return to their position. They advanced some distance up the Heights, but did not regain the breastwork. That evening Col. MILES was on Maryland Heights for some hours, consulting with Col. FORD. He left between 11 and 12 o'clock, without directly ordering Col. FORD to evacuate the Heights, but instructing him, in case he was compelled to do so, to spike his guns, and throw the heavy siege guns down the mountain. About 2 o'clock, perhaps a little later, by the order of Col. FORD, the Heights were abandoned, the guns being spiked according to instructions. On Sunday. Col. D'UTASSY sent over to the Maryland Heights four companies under Maj. WOOD, who brought off, without opposition, four brass 12-pounders, two of which were imperfectly spiked, and a wagon load of ammunition. Gen. WHITE, on his return to Harper's Ferry on the 12th of September, suggested to Col. MILES the propriety of contracting his lines on Bolivar Heights so as to make a better defence, stating that he was determined to make his stand on Bolivar Heights. Gen. WHITE also urged the importance of Holding Maryland Heights, even should it require the taking the entire force over there from Harper's Ferry. Col. MILES, tinder his orders to hold Harper's Ferry to the last extremity, while admitting the importance of Maryland Heights, seemed to regard them as applying to the town of Harper's Ferry, and held that to leave Harper's Ferry even to go on Maryland Heights would be disobeying his instructions. Gen. MCCLELLAN established his headquarters at Frederick City on the morning of the 13th of September. On the night of the 13th, after the evacuation of Maryland Heights, Col. MILES directed Capt. (now Major) RUSSELL, of the Maryland Cavalry, to take with him a few men and endeavor to get through the enemy's lines, and reach some of our forces -- Gen. MCCLELLAN if possible -- and to report the condition of Harper's Ferry, that it could not hold out more than forty-eight hours unless reinforced, and to urge the sending of reinforcements. Capt. RUSSELL reached Gen. MCCLELLAN's headquarters at Frederick at 9 A.M . on Sunday, the 14th of September, and reported as directed by Col. MILES. Immediately upon his arrival Gen. MCCLELLAN sent off a messenger, as Capt. RUSSELL understood, to Gen. FRANKLIN. At 10 A.M., Capt. RUSSELL left for Gen. FRANKLIN's command, with a communication to Gen. FRANKLIN from Gen. MCCLELLAN. He reached Gen. FRANKLIN about 3 o'clock that afternoon, and found him engaged with the enemy at Crampton's Gap. The enemy were driven from the Gap, and the next morning, the 15th, Gen. FRANKLIN passed through the Gap, advancing about a mile, and finding the enemy drawn up in line of battle in his front, drew his own forces up in line of battle. While thus situated, the cannonading in the direction of Harper's Ferry, which had been heard very distinctly all the [???] -- Harper's Ferry being about seven miles distant -- suddenly ceased, whereupon Gen. FRANKLIN sent word to Gen. MCCLELLAN of the probable surrender of Harper's Ferry by Col. MILES, and did not deem it necessary to proceed further in that direction. The battle of South Mountain was fought on Sunday, the 14th, On the same day, (Sunday,) during the afternoon, the enemy at Harper's Ferry attacked the extreme left of the line on Bolivar Heights, but after some time were repulsed by the troops under command of Gen. WHITE. Sunday night the cavalry at Harper's Ferry made their escape, under Col. DAVIS, of the Twelfth Illinois Cavalry, by permission of Col. MILES, and reached Grrencastle, Penn., the next morning, capturing an ammunition train belonging to Gen. LONGSTREET, consisting of some 50 or 60 wagons. The Commission regard this escape of the cavalry, &c. Several of the infantry officers desired permission to cut their way out at the same time the cavalry made their escape, but Col. MILES refused, upon the ground that he had never been ordered to hold Harper's Ferry to the last extremity. On the morning of they 15th, the enemy opened their batteries from several points -- seven to nine as estimated by different witnesses -- directing their attack principally upon our batteries on the left of Bolivar Heights. The attack commenced at daybreak. About 7 o'clock, Col. MILES represented to Gen. WHITE that it would be necessary to surrender. Gen. WHITE suggested that the brigade commanders be called together, which was done. Col. MILES Mated that the ammunition for the batteries was exhausted, and he had about made up his mind to surrender. That was agreed to by all present, and Gen. WHITE was sent by Col. MILES to arrange terms. The white flag was raised by order of Col. MILES, but the enemy did not cease fire for some half or three-quarters of an hour after. Col. MILES was mortally wounded after the white flag was raised. The surrender was agreed upon about 8 A.M. on Monday, the 15th of September. The following was the testimony respectively of the officers commanding batteries: At the time of the surrender? Capt. VON SCHLEN had some ammunition, could not tell what amount, but mostly shrapnel; had lost about 100 rounds on Saturday, the 13th, by the explosion of a limber caused by one of the enemy's shells. Capt. RIGBY had expended, during the siege of Harper's Ferry, about 600 rounds, with the exception of canister; had nothing but canister left. Capt. POTTS had expended about 1,000 rounds, with the exception of canister; had only canister lett. Capt. GRAHAM had but two guns of his battery under his immediate command on the morning of the surrender; had probably 100 rounds of all kinds, but so long-time fuses. Capt. PHILLIPS had expended all his [???], except some 40 rounds of canister, and some long-range shell too large for his guns, Capt. [???] Battery had been spiked and left on Maryland Heights on Saturday. It appears, that during the siege, and shortly previous, Col. MILES paroled several Confederate prisoners, permitting them to pass through our [???]. During the week previous so the evacuation of Maryland Heights, a Lieut. [???] of the Twelfth Virginia Cavalry, who had been engaged in a raid upon a train from Harper's Ferry to Winchester a short time before, was captured and brought into Harper's Ferry. He escaped while on the way to the hospital to have his [???] out was [???]. He was [???] [???] command of some rebel cavalry on the [???] of the surrender. The [???] A.P. HILL was railed to the fact that [???] [???] and Twenty-sixth New-York Regiment Infantry, and recommends that Major BAIRD should, for his bad conduct as shown by this evidence, be dismissed the service. Some of the officers after the wounding of the gallant Colonel, such as Lieut. HARRAS, and others not known to the Commission, behaved with gallantry and should be commended. In the case of Col. FORD, charged with improper conduct in abandoning the Maryland Heights, the Commission, after a careful bearing of the evidence produced by the Government and that relied on by the defence, and a due consideration of the arguments offered by counsel, find: That on the 5th of September. Col. FORD was placed In command of Maryland Heights by Col. MILES. That Col. FORD, finding the position unprepared by fortifications, earnestly urged Col. MILES to furnish him means by which the Heights could be made tenable for the small force under his command, should a heavy one be brought against him. That these reasonable demands were, from some cause unknown to the Commission, not responded to by the officer in command of Harper's Ferry. That subsequently, when the enemy appeared in heavy force, Col. FORD frequently and earnestly called upon Col. MILES for more troops, representing that he could not hold the Heights unless reinforced. That these demands were feebly or not at all complied with. That as late as the morning of the 13th, Col. FORD sent two written demands to Col. MILES for reinforcements, and saying that with the troops then under his command he could not hold the Heights, and unless relieved or otherwise ordered, he would have to abandon them. That as late as 11 o'clock A.M. of the 13th, a few hours previous to the abandonment of this position, Col. MILES said to Col. FORD that he (Col. FORD) could not have another man, and must do the best be could, and if unable to defend the place, he must spike the guns, throw them down the hill, and withdraw to Harper's Ferry in good order. The Court is then satisfied that Col. FORD was given a discretionary power to abandon the Heights, as his better judgment might dictate; and it believes from the evidence, circumstantial and direct, that the result did not to any great extent surprise nor in any way displease the officer in command at Harper's Ferry. But this conclusion, so much relied upon by the defence, forces the Commission to a consideration of the fact -- did Col. FORD, under the discretionary power thus vested in him, make a proper defence of the Heights, and hold them, as he should have done, until driven off by the enemy? The evidence shows conclusively that the force upon the Heights was not well managed; that the point most pressed was weakly defended as to numbers, and, alter the wounding of the Colonel of the One Hundred and Twenty-sixth Regiment New-York Infantry, it was left without a competent officer to command. Col. FORD himself not appearing, nor designating anyone who might have restored order and encouraged the men ; that the abandonment of the Heights was premature, is clearly proved. Our forces were not driven from the hill, as full time was given to spike the guns and throw the heavier ones down the cliff, and retreat in good order to Harper's Ferry. The next day a force returning to the Heights found them unoccupied, and brought away unmolested four abandoned gone and a quanitity of ammunition. In so grave a case as this, with such disgraceful consequences, the Court cannot permit an officer to shield himself behind the fact that he did as well as he could, if in so doing he exhibits a lack of military capacity. It is clear to the Commission that Col. FORD should not have been placed in command on Maryland Heights; that he conducted the defence without ability, and abandoned his position without sufficient cause, and has shown throughout such a lack of military capacity as to disqualify him, in the opinion of the Commission, for a command in the service. The Commission has approached a consideration of the conduct of Col. D.S. MILES, in connection with the surrender of Harper's Ferry, with extreme reluctance. An officer who cannot appear before any earthly tribunal to answer or explain charges gravely affecting his character; who has met his death at the hands of the enemy, even upon the spot he disgracefully surrenders, is entitled to the tenderest care and most careful investigation. This the Commission has accorded Col. MILES, and in giving a decision only repeats what runs' through our 900 pages of testimony strangely unanimous upon the fact, tha Col. MILES incapacity, amounting to almost imbecility, led to the shameful surrender of this important post. Early on the 15th of August he disobeys the orders of Major-Gen. WOOL to fortify Maryland Heights. When it is surrounded and attacked by the enemy, its naturally strong positions are unimproved, and from his criminal neglect, to use the mildest term, the large force of the enemy is almost upon an equality with the small force under his command. He seems to have understood, and admitted to his officers, that Maryland Heights is the key to the position, and yet he places Col. FORD in command, with a feeble force -- makes no effort to strengthen them by fortifications, although between the 5th and 14th of September there was ample time to do so; and, to Col. FORD's repeated demands for means to intrench, and additional reinforcements, he makes either an inadequate return or no response at all. He gives Col. FORD a discretionary power as to when he shall abandon the Heights -- the fact of abandonment having, it seems, been concluded on in his own mind. For, when this unhappy event really occurs, his only exclamation was to the effect that he feared Col. FORD had given up too soon -- although he must have known that the abandonment of Marylaed Heights was the surrender of Harper's Ferry. This leaving the key of the position to the keeping of Col. FORD, with discretionary power, after the arrival of that capable and courageous officer, who had waived his rank to serve wherever ordered, is one of the more striking facts illustrating the incapacity of Col. MILES. Immediately previous to, and pending the siege of Harper's Ferry, he paroles rebel prisoners and permits, indeed sends them to the enemy's headquarters. This, too, when be should have known that the lack of ammunition, the bad conduct of some of our troops, the entire absence of fortifications, and the abandonment of Maryland Heights, were important facts they could, and undoubtedly did, communicate to the enemy. Sixteen of these prisoners were paroled on the 13th. and a pass given them in the handwriting; of Col. MILES, while a rebel officer by the name of ROUSE, after an escape, is retaken, and subsequently has a private interview with Col. MILES, and alter the surrenders appears at the head of his men among the first to enter Harper's Ferry. It is not necessary to accumulate evidence from the mass that throughout scarcely affords one fact in contradiction to what each one establishes, that Col. MILES was incapable of conducting a defence so important as was this of Harper's Ferry. The Commission would not have dwelled upon this painful subject, were it not for the fact that the officer who placed this incapable in command, should share in the responsibility, and in the opinion of the Commission, Major-Gen. WOOL is guilty to this extent of a grave disaster, and should be censured for his conduct. The Commission has remarked freely on Col. MILES, an old officer, who has been killed in the service of his country, and it cannot from any motives of delicacy, refrain from censuring those in nigh command, when it thinks such censure deserved. The General-in-Chief has testified that Gen. MCCLELLAN after having received orders to repel the enemy invading the State of Maryland, marched only six miles per day on an average, when pursuing this invading enemy. The General-in-Chief also testifies, that in his opinion Gen. MCCLELLAN could and should have relieved and protected Harper's Ferry, and in this opinion the Commission fully concur. The evidence thus introduced confirms the Commission in the opinion that Harper's Ferry, as well as Maryland Heights, was prematurely surrendered, The garrison should have been satisfied that relief, however long delayed, would come at last, and that a thousand men killed in Harper's Ferry would have made a small loss had the post been saved, and probably saved two thousand at Antietam. How important was this defence we can now appreciate. Of the 97,000 men composing at that time the whole of LEE's army, more than one-third were attacking Harper's Ferry. And of this, the main body was in Virginia. By reference to the evidence, it will be seen that at the very moment Col. FORD abandoned Maryland Heights his little army was in reality relieved by Gens. FRANKLIN and SUMNER's corps at Crampton's Gap, within seven miles of his position; and that after the surrender of Harper's Ferry no time was given to parole prisoners before 20,000 troops were hurried from Virginia, and the entire force went off on the double quick to relieve LEE, who was bring attacked at Antietam. Had the garrison been slower to surrender, or the Army of the Potomac swifter to march, the enemy would have been forced to raise the siege, or would have been taken in detail, with the Potomac dividing his forces.

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