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Battles of Fort Fisher
Southern Historical Society Papers

Defence and Fall of Fort Fisher

 

 

We have been appealed to by friends in various quarters to publish the two following papers on the fall of Fort Fisher. General Bragg's letter to his brother, written just after the event, and published for the first time in the daily papers last year -- and the reply of Colonel Lamb who was in command of Fort Fisher when it fell. While always regretting controversies between Confederates -- and having it distinctly understood that we are not responsible for statements or sentiments of papers which we publish with responsible names attached -- it is, perhaps proper that we should print, without note or comment of our own, these two papers on a most interesting and important event of the war.

 

LETTER FROM GENERAL BRAXTON BRAGG.

Wilmington, 20th January, 1865.

 

My Dear Thomas:

          Your very kind note of the 13th only reached me this morning, but we are none the less grateful. The unexpected blow which has fallen upon us is almost stunning, but it shall not impair my efforts. Two hours before hearing of the certain fall of the fort I felt as confident as ever man did of successfully defending it. The responsibility is all mine, of course, and I shall bear it as resolutely as possible, but time will make known some matters which may as well be told you now in confidence. No human power could have prevented the enemy from landing, covered as he was by a fleet of ships carrying six hundred heavy guns. Anywhere beyond the range of our heavy guns on the fort our land force could not approach him. Once landed, our only chance was to keep him, if possible, from the fort. With less than half his numbers, had we extended far enough towards the fort to prevent his movement that way, he could have crossed the narrow peninsula north of us and cut us off entirely, when the fort and all must have gone. The land is heavily timbered and very swampy. We then confronted him as closely as possible to watch his movements and endeavor to strike if he moved from under his shipping. A dense swamp lay between us and extended three miles towards Fort Fisher. In this position I found the two forces when I reached General Hoke, and took the command just at night on Friday. Cavalry was on our extended right towards Fort Fisher, and occupying ground entirely to the sea, placing us between the enemy and the fort for observation. These were to report any movement, and the troops lay upon their arms all night, ready to move to the attack or towards the fort if the enemy did so. My knowledge of the ground was good, as I knew General Hoke's to be, both of us having been over it. I fully approved his dispositions. We stayed in our camp under the heavy shelling of the enemy's fleet for the night. No report of any movement having been made, we moved out early to reconnoitre, Hoke towards the fort and I to our left. I found the enemy in strong force in front of our left, as well as could be seen across the swamp. But to our great surprise Hoke found him extended beyond our right and entirely across the peninsula between us and Fort Fisher, and strongly entrenched, having, no doubt, been there most of the night. Not a word had been heard from our cavalry, and they had evidently withdrawn from their position in the night and did not themselves know what had occurred, for they fired on Hoke and his staff, who got in front of them in reconnoitering. On learning this I put the command in motion and ordered the enemy dislodged, if it was at all practicable. General Hoke and his brigadiers made a close reconnoissance and expressed to me the opinion that their troops were unequal to the task. I moved forward with them and made a close examination, confirmed their opinion, and after a conference decided not to attack. An attack and failure would have ensured the fall of the fort and would also have opened the whole State. We could not have succeeded without defeating double our numbers behind entrenchments, whilst at the same time exposed to a raking fire from their fleet, plainly in sight and within good range, the sea as smooth as glass. But I did not feel the slightest apprehension for the fort. The enemy had landed without artillery and not even a general officer brought a horse. Prisoners captured and deserters coming in concurred in one report, that if repulsed once they would immediately retreat (re- embark) the work being considered too strong for them. Believing myself that Grant's army could not storm and carry the fort, if it was defended, I felt perfect confidence that the enemy had assumed a most precarious position, from which he would escape with great difficulty. I accordingly ordered Hoke to entrench immediately in his front, and push his lines close on him, so as to keep him engaged and closely observed. Whilst this was going on I started one thousand of our best men, who had defended forts at Charleston, to reinforce Fisher, and, as I considered the garrison there already as sufficient, being 2,000 strong, I ordered about 600 less reliable troops to come out, considering it an unnecessary exposure of life to keep them there. This order, however, was rescinded on Whiting's appeal, and he was allowed to keep the whole. With this garrison I considered the fort perfectly safe, and capable of standing any length of siege. We had steamboat communication with it, which we could keep up at all times during the night.

          Had the cavalry done its duty and promptly reported the enemy's movements, I do not think the result would have been different. Such was the configuration of the country and the obstacles that he would have accomplished his object with the force he had. Our only safe reliance was in his repulse, we being the weak and assailed party. The reports from the fort were of the most favorable character up to Sunday evening. Not a gun reported injured, the fort not damaged, -- and our loss three killed and thirty two wounded in nearly three days. With these statements I felt confident that when the assault was made it would be easily repulsed, and so telegraphed to General Whiting.

          During Saturday I was greatly disturbed by the tone and phraseology of General Whiting's dispatches, and by reports of others received from him in town. * * * * *

          About 3 o'clock Sunday evening, General H. informed me the enemy was moving apparently to assault the fort. He immediately moved to attack them under my direction. A feeble musketry fire was heard at the fort, when it ceased, not lasting over ten minutes. Hoke found them in very strong position and heavy force ready to receive him. He moved in person close up to their lines with his skirmishers, receiving two balls in his clothes, between the left arm and breast. Their line was impracticable for his small command, and I did not hesitate to recall him. He could not have succeeded. When the assault commenced on the fort the fleet ceased to fire, and in less than half an hour it recommenced with great fury. My inference was that they were repulsed. A report soon reached me, however, from a party across the river, that "the enemy have the fort." As the firing from the fleet on the fort continued, I disregarded the report. At 7 P.M. a dispatch from General Whiting reported: "We still hold the fort but are hard pressed." Soon after another from his Adjutant said: "We are still in possession of the fort," &c. My mind was easy. General Colquitt and his reinforcements were hurried forward. The bombardment continued heavily until about 10 P.M., when all became quiet. Unpleasant reports continued to reach me, but nothing worthy of credit until an escaped officer reported from across the river by telegraph that the fort was captured. General Colquitt soon returned and reported. He landed at the point about a mile behind the fort at 10.30 P.M., found everything in confusion, hundreds of men without arms, many of them drunk, and no one apparently in command. Colonel Lamb was there wounded. General Whiting was also pointed out, lying on the beach, severely wounded. * * The enemy soon approached and Colquitt barely had time to escape in his small boat. Now for statements made by the enemy when meeting us under flag of truce. They assert that they walked into the fort without resistance, not a shot being fired at them, our men all being in the bombproofs. That after they got in a small force was rallied and fought them very gallantly, inflicting a heavy loss, but they soon overcame them and captured most of our officers and men without arms, under cover of the bombproofs. * * * *

          Blockade running has cured itself. I knew its demoralizing influence, and even before I came here, had urged on the President to remove these officers and troops, replacing them by veterans. * * I was at work on these evils, gradually correcting them, but meeting with the usual denunciation. Time was not allowed.

          The defense of the fort ought to have been successful against this attack, but it had to fall eventually -- the expedition brought against it was able to reduce it in spite of all I could do. The fleet, after dismounting our guns, could have arranged itself above their land forces, and no spot of ground for six miles above Fort Fisher could have been held by our land forces. Owing to the depth of water they could get nearer to us than they could to Fort Fisher, and could sweep everything to the middle of the river.

          The same operation, on a much smaller scale was entirely successful against the forts at the mouth of Charleston harbor, except that they were well defended by sober, resolute men, until it was necessary to evacuate, and the harbor was closed by the fall of Fort Wagner. * * But enough for the present. I am both tired and sad.

          I knew my wife would be welcome with you, but I feared it would look badly for me to send her off in the panic, and I concluded for her to remain. It has had a good effect on the weak and nervous.

* * * * * *:

          Will you please send me by express the barrel of flour you have for me? Our only trouble is to get enough to eat, as we pay our board in kind. No one will take a boarder here or anywhere now for money. * *

 

Braxton Bragg.

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