The following article is transcribed from the New York Times, dated March 31, 1862: 

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          Gen. SHIELDS has written the following letter to a friend in Washington, giving an informal account of the battle:

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          HEADQUARTERS GEN. SHIELD'S DIVISION, WINCHESTER, Va., March 26, 1862. I will give you a brief account of our late operations. My reconnaissance beyond Strasburgh, on the 18th and 19th insts., discovered JACKSON reinforced, in a strong position, near New-Market, within supporting distance of the main body of the rebels under JOHNSON. It was necessary to decoy him from that position. Therefore I fell back rapidly to Winchester on the 20th, as if in retreat, marching my whole command nearly thirty miles in one day. My force was placed at night in a secluded position, two miles from Winchester, on the Martinsburgh road. On the 21st the rebel cavalry, under ASHDY, showed themselves to our pickets, within sight of Winchester. On the 22d all of Gen. BANKS' command, with the exception of my division, evacuated Winchester, en route for Centreville. This movement and the masked position of my division made an impression upon the inhabitants, some of whom were in secret communication with the enemy, that our army had left, and that nothing remained but a few regiments to garrison this place. JACKSON was signalized to this effect. I saw their signals and divined their meaning. About 5 o'clock on the afternoon of the 22d ASHBY, believing that the town was almost evacuated, attacked our pickets and drove them in. This success increased his delusion. It became necessary, however, to repulse them for the time being, I, therefore, ordered forward a brigade, and placed it in front, between Winchester and the enemy. I only let them see, however, two regiments of infantry, two batteries of artillery, and a small force of cavalry, which he mistook as the whole force left to garrison and protect the place. In a little skirmish that evening, while placing the artillery in position, I was struck by a fragment of a shell, which broke my arm above the elbow, injured my shoulder, and damaged me otherwise, to such an extent that I have lain prostrate ever since. I commenced making preparations for any emergency that might occur that night or the next morning. Under cover of the night I ordered an entire brigade (KIMBALL's) to take up a strong position in advance. I pushed forward four batteries, having them placed in a strong position to support the infantry, I placed SULLIVAN's Brigade on both flanks to prevent surprise and to keep my flank from being turned, and I held TYLER's Brigade reserve, to operate against any point that might be assailed in front. In this position I awaited and expected the enemy's attack next morning. My advance brigade was two miles from the town, its pickets extending perhaps a mile further along the turnpike leading to Strasburgh. About 8 o'clock in the morning. I sent forward two officers to reconnoitre the front and report indications of the enemy. They returned in an hour, reporting no enemy in sight except ASHBY's force of cavalry, infantry and artillery, which by this time had become familiar and contemptible to us. Gen. BANKS, who was yet here in person, upon hearing the report, concluded that JACKSON could not be in front possibly, or be decoyed so far away from the main body of the rebel army. In this opinion I, too, begun to concur, concurring that JACKSON was too sagacious to be caught in such a trap. Gen. BANKS therefore left for Washington. His Staff officers were directed to follow the same day, by way of Centreville. Knowing the crafty enemy, however, I had to deal with, I omitted no precaution. My whole force was concentrated, and prepared to support KIMBALL's Brigade, which was in advance. About 10 1/2 o'clock it became evident we had a considerable force before us; but the enemy still concealed himself so adroitly in the woods that it was impossible to estimate it. I ordered a portion of the artillery forward to open fire and unmask them. By degrees they began to show themselves. They planted battery after battery in strong position, on the centre and on both flanks, Our artillery responded, and this continued until about 3 1/4 o'clock in the afternoon, when I directed a column of infanfry to carry a battery on their left flank and to assail that flank, which was done promptly and splendidly by TYLER's Brigade, aided by some regiments from the other brigades. The fire of our infantry was so close and destructive that it made havoc in their ranks. The result was the capture of their guns on the left and the forcing back of their wing on the centre, thus placing them in a position to be routed by a general attack, which was made about 5 o'clock by all the infantry, and succeeded in driving them in flight from the field. Night fell upon us at this stage leaving us in possession of the field of battle, two guns and four caissons, three hundred prisoners and about one thousand stand of small arms. Our killed in this engagement cannot exceed out hundred men; wounded, two hundred and thirty-three. The enemy's killed and wounded exceed one thousand. The inhabitants of the adjacent villages carried them to their houses as they were removed from the field of battle. Houses between the battlefield and Strasburgh, and even far beyond, have since been found filled with the dead and dying of the enemy. Graves have been discovered far removed from the road, where the inhabitants of the country buried them as they died. Gen. BANKS, in his pursuit of the enemy beyond Strasburgh afterward, found houses on the road twenty-two miles from the battle-field [???] in this manner, and presenting the most ghostly spectacle. The havoc made on the [???] of the rebels [???] struck this whole region of country with terror. such a blow had never fallen on them before, and it is more crushing because wholly unexpected. [???] and his stone-wall brigade, and all the other brigades accompanying him, will never meet this [???] in battle. During the night they managed to carry of their artillery in the darkness. We opened upon them by early light next morning, and they commenced retreat. Gen. BANKS returned from Harpen's Ferry between 8 and 10 o'clock A.M., and placed himself as my request, at the head of the command, ton miles from the battle-field, pursuing the enemy. Reinforcements, which we had ordered back from WILLIAM's Division, and which I had ordered forward during the night, now came pouring in, and with all these we continued the pursuit, pressing then with [???] and with repeated and destructive attacks, as far as Woodstock, where we halted from mere exhaustion. The enemy's sufferings have been terrible and such as they have nowhere else endured since the commencement of this war; and yet such were their gallantry and high state of discipline that at no time daring the battle or pursuit did they give way to panic. They fled to Mount Jackson, and are by this time, no doubt, in communication with the main body on the rebel army. I hope to be able in a few days to ride in a buggy, and place myself at the head of my command, but I have neither sufficient force nor insufficient rank to do that service to the country that I hope and feel I are capable of. No one could be better treated then I am by Gen. BANKS, and yet it he and his command had been here on the 23d, you would have heard nothing of a fight, because our wity enemy would not have been entrapped. I want an efficient cavalry regiment -- the Third United States Cavalry, for instance -- and additional infantry. I wish you would see the Secretary of War, for instance, in relation to the matter. I can do the county survive if they give me a chance. JAMES SHIELDS.

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