The following article is from the New York Times, dated April 19, 1862:

 

The Reduction of Fort Pulaski Another Revolution in the Art of War

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          The bombardment and capture of Fort Pulaski whereof we to-day give a detailed description by our special correspondent is one of those actions which, like the combat of the ironsides in Hampton Roads, have a double significance being at once a valuable success in our scheme of seaboard operations, and adding most important contributions to the science of attack and defence. It has been the fortune of the present war to inaugurate a revolution in naval warfare; and the likelihood seems to be that it is destined to introduce a similar revolution into one branch of land warfare. Certainly, if it would be rash to say that our experiments on the Southern fortifications show that such works are powerless against modern heavy artillery and improved projectiles, in the same way as the wooden walls were powerless against the resistless shock of the Merrimac, we are at least justified in claiming that these experiments must henceforth introduce fundamental modifications into the theory and practice of land defences. The account of the bombardment of Fort Pulaski, which we publish, will, no doubt, be read throughout Europe with an interest almost equal to that with which the battle of the Monitor and Merrimac was received. That affair has already prompted the British Parliament to order the suspension of operations on the works at Spithead, and they will soon consider the propriety of a general transfer of fortification appropriations to build armor-clad ships. The bombardment of Fort Pulaski will probably clinch their determination to do so, while the illustrations it will afford of the effects of our American ordnance and improved projectiles, will probably visit them with unpleasant suspicions whether even their stoutest ironsides will be able to resist the terrible impact of these new Yankee notions.

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          The reduction of Fort Pulaski has a quite other importance than the taking of the forts hitherto captured, whether on the coast or inland. The fortifications at Hatteras, at Port Royal and on the Western rivers, were earthworks, of recent construction and without casemates. Pulaski, on the contrary, is one of the strongest and most scientifically constructed forts in the country. Its brick walls are not less than nine feet in thickness and forty feet high. It covers an area larger than Fort Sumter, and cost a million of dollars. It has always been regarded by the country as impregnable, and the rebels, who sixteen months ago usurped its possession, have repeatedly so proclaimed it. And impregnable it probably was under the old regime, and in the view in which it was built. In case of foreign invasion, vessels in attempting to approach the fort or essaying to pass up the river to Savannah, would be obliged to come within 100 yards of the fort, and at this point the guns of large calibre could be made to concentrate and destroy everything but a Monitor or a Merrimac; while in air engagement with a naval force using the old smoothbore cannon all the traditional advantages that land fortifications have been accounted as possessing over a floating foe would come into play. Beside, it was always contemplated, that in case of invasion by a foreign enemy, the various islands contiguous to the islet on which Fort Pulaski is located, would be occupied in force, and thus prevent the assailant from obtaining a foothold where he could plant his batteries. This the rebels were powerless to do, and some months ago these islands were taken possession of by a National force, and preparations for the reduction of the fort commenced. Moreover, a back passage in the rear of Fort Pulaski, and on its weak side, was discovered, and when occupied, as it was last February, by a portion of our army of the South, the fort was completely isolated from Savannah. It was then that the work of erecting batteries of rifled cannon and mortars on Tybee and the neighboring islands was begun. The history of these operations, so ably planned and admirably executed under the direction of Gen. GILMORE, is fully told in the narrative of our special correspondent, while the accompanying diagrams bring the plan of bombardment vividly before the eye. The reduction of the fort, after two days' bombardment, was the consequence, first, of the admirable base of operations selected by the National force; and, secondly, of the character of the warlike enginery employed; and touching this a word is due.

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         The line of National batteries on Tybee Island -- eleven in number -- consisted of ten and thirteen-inch mortars and columbiads, and Parrott's and James' rifled cannon, of the largest calibre, with the improved conical projectiles -- the firing being at ranges varying from 1,643 to 3,476 yards. The bombardment opened on the 10th, but strangely enough, though the effect of the firing was visible on the fort from the first, after twelve hours no breach had been made. One or two of the guns were dismounted, and some of the embrasures were injured, but it was not till 10 o'clock on the morning of the 11th that any important breach in the walls of the fort was made. It will be remembered that the Savannah journal, through which the first tidings of the assault came, stated that the projectiles fired from our guns went at once through the walls, but, as might readily be conceived, such was not the case. Repeated shots, aimed at the same place, with extreme accuracy, did the work which the rebels attributed to single shots. We took occasion at the time of the first report to doubt that any breach had been made in the walls themselves, and surmised that it could only have been the embrasures (which are but four or five feet in thickness) that were pierced. We based this suspicion on the known penetrative power of shot of a certain weight; but much larger ordnance than we had understood were to be employed were brought into use; and we have concurrent, official and unofficial testimony that the sides were actually perforated. It remains, therefore, a most notable fact, that breaches of huge dimensions were made in the walls of Pulaski, nine feet in thickness!

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         The conclusion is irresistible. Whatever may be the effect of modern projectiles on granite fortifications, brick walls are powerless before their fierce impact, and an iron facing for works of that kind must henceforth be an absolute necessity.

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          The strategic importance of the point gained is so obvious as hardly to need comment. It places within our reach the chief Southern city of the Atlantic seaboard, and relieves the large blockading squadron which it has been necessary to employ on that coast. We consider it doubtful, however, whether any immediate advance will be made on Savannah. It has been the policy of the Government to get possession of as much as possible of the Southern coasts, and give the cities the go-by. Large cities with recalcitrant populations are bothersome customers to deal with. But the deeper they become enveloped in the anarchy they have themselves created, the more desirous will they be of receiving the national protection. Savannah is reported by Southern witnesses to be now in a state of indescribable panic; and we greatly err if her people do not end by welcoming as deliverers those whom they have ere while repelled as invaders.

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