The following article is transcribed from Harper's Weekly Journal of Civilization, dated September 27, 1862:
The Rebel Raid into Maryland
At the hour we write it is uncertain whether the rebel army in Maryland is being absolutely extinguished, or whether it is recuperating from the defeat it suffered at the hands of General McClellan on 14th. Before these lines reach the reader he will probably know the facts. Lee may possibly maintain himself in some strong position until reinforcements reach him from Richmond, and may thus be enabled to renew the contest. But the chances are that he well suffer so much, and be so hardly pressed, that, by the time Beauregard reaches him with the 40,000 men who are said to have marched form Gordonsville, his army will be a wreck, and escape, not victory, will be his exclusive object.
Well-informed observers never could be made to believe that Lee would cross the Potomac. General McClellan is said to have replied, when he was told the rebels had crossed: "It's too good to be true." He and most of us here gave the rebels credit for more wisdom. It was evident, as we took occasion to show in our last number, that to cross the river and not to take Washington or Baltimore would be fatal to the rebel army. Nothing but the immediate capture of one or both of these cities could redeem the stop, or save the army from in inevitable consequences.. McClellan knew perfectly well that Lee could not take either Washington or Baltimore, and therefore argued that he would not cross the river. He did cross: he did not take Washington or Baltimore, or even seriously threaten them; and the result will probably be the destruction of his army.
People are asking what was the object of the rebels in invading Maryland, if the invasion was so sure to be fatal to them?
In the first place, it is not likely that the rebel leaders were aware of the strength of Washington, or the defenses of Baltimore. They may, perhaps, have believed that they could make a sudden dash upon the railroad and seize one or other of these cities. If our armies had been handled awkwardly, if they had delayed to follow the rebels across the river, if McClellan had marched on Leesburg, as some of his generals are said to have advised, this hope might have been realized. It was only when Jackson discovered the enormous army of McClellan moving westwardly toward the Monocacy, and wedging itself in between the rebels and the fords by which they had crossed, that he realized its utter futility. Again, some of the rebel leaders are said to have been so foolish and so ignorant as to rely upon what they called "a popular rising" in Maryland. We at the North, who have had pretty frequent occasion of late to take measure of Maryland, knew all along how much this resource amounted to. We had thought of the "popular rising"long before it occurred to the rebels, and applied the antidote. Baltimore might have "risen" if her people had chosen; but it would only have been to fall prostrate in ashes in very short order. Annapolis might have "risen"; but twenty-four hours would have settled her account with history. Whatever opinions of the Marylanders may be -- and we hope they are sound and loyal -- they had no more chance of "rising" than the convicts in a well-ordered penitentiary.
We can not help thinking that the true secret of the rebel invasion of Maryland, and of the similar demonstration against Ohio, is simply the utter desperation of the rebel leaders. They have seen, in the course of fifteen months, a Union army of less than half a million of men overrun and conquer nearly the whole of three large States, and parts of seven others; they have seen their strongest positions wrested from them, and their finest armies beaten and dispersed; they have lost New Orleans and the Mississippi River; they have failed in every enterprise they undertook and we have succeeded in every enterprise of ours save one only; they have seen their coast line, over 3000 miles long, which every one was sure could not be blockaded, hermetically sealed against commerce; they have lost every vessel they built, from the Merrimac to the Arkansas; they seen their people enduring miseries such as no people in modern times have over suffered before; and with this frightful catalogue of disaster and misfortune to dispirit them, they see that, if the contest is to be prolonged, they must wage it against an army of a million of men and a fleet of impregnable iron-clad vessels. Can any one wonder at their being desperate? What could they do except to attempt some wild, desperate scheme, such as the invasion of Maryland and Ohio, and trust to luck, accident, or the blunders of our generals for success? To remain where they were, and wait to be attacked by a million of men, was simply ruin without a chance of escape. To invade us was also probably ruin; but there was a remote possibility that in some extraordinary freak fortune might come to their aid and enable them to seize Washington or Cincinnati. To this vague hope they probably clung, and hence their late movements.
It seems that the period of ill-luck which commenced with the seven days' battles is ended at last, and that the fortune is once more on our side. Let us beware of our past errors. Let us not pronounce our generals imbecile, or traitors, or cowards, because they are not uniformly successful. See what McClellan has done now! Let us not cry aloud to Heaven to restore the chaos when we meet with a trifling check. We shall meet with many checks yet before the war ends: it will be enough for good men if after all it ends well.