THE WAR CORRESPONDECE OF THE LOND0N TIMES.; Another Letter from Mr. Russell on the Results of the Battle at Bull Run.
Published: August 28, 1861
WASHINGTON, Monday, July 29,1861.
purpose or settled plan to pursue an aggressive war or even "to liberate Maryland if they have the; means of doing so." And, indeed, their successwas, as I suspected, not known to them in its full proportions, and their loss. combined, perhaps, with the condition of their Army, as much as political and prudential motives actuating leaders,may have had a fair share in producingthe state of inactivity with which the Federalists have no reason to be dissatisfied. Let us look around, now that the smoke of battle has cleared away, and try to examine the condition of the ground. First as regards foreign relations. The personal good feeling and perfect understanding which exist between the representatives of the geat European Powers directly interested in America are founded, on an appreciation of the exact demands of the interests they represent, and on the necessities of a common honorable policy. England, having a vast commerce directly involved in the contest, has naturally been the first to provide for its safety in American waters, and has also felt it desirable, in the face of the desperate counsels which have been given on this side of the Atlantic, to furnish a trifling reinforcement to her small military establishment in Canada. The fleet at present in observation is neither powerful nor offensively disposed, and no exception can be taken to the mode in which it has acted by the most sensitive Americans, Although attempts have been made to arouse vulgar prejudices by erroneous statements respecting the views and declarations of Admiral MILNE. The authoritative assertions on that subject in some of the journals here are destitute of the authority, except that of the writer. What is of more consequence, perhaps, in respect to the preservation of friendly relations between England and the United States is the fact that a great change has come over the views of the members or member of the Cabinet who was supposed to seek the reconstruction of the Union in a war with Great Britain, and that the most favorable disposition is evinced to cultivate our good graces, not by any sacrifice of principles, but by the adoption of a tone at once calm, just and dignified, which will be appreciated by the Foreign-office. It is not probable either that we shall hear much more about the immediate annexation of Canada, and the fury of the 750,000 "better than French" soldiers with which we were threatened, will be for a time averted. But if there are such pleasant changes in the diplomatic and Press world there is nothing at all like them in commercial relations. In the Senate it is proposed to clap a round ten per cent. on all the duties to be levied under the Morrill Tariff, and Mr. SIMMONS, the aged father of this wicked little bit of political economy, declares he will thereby raise $45,000,000 of additional revenue. The House of Representatives, on the contrary, propose to raise revenue by taxes on coffee, tea, sugar, pepper, spices and articles of the sort, not of necessity nor of luxury, but in the intermediate position, so that every one who uses them now will continue to do so, notwithstanding the tax, and no one will be the worse for it. On these plans it is probable there will be a conference between the two branches of the Legislature, in which the contending systems may be adjusted or amalgamated. The income to be adopted will give some $40,000,000 according to the calculations of the designers, and the people fondly believe it will be at once removed as soon as the war is over. If the increase of ten per cent. on the Morrill Tariff be actually passed, it is difficult to see how France can continue to regard with friendly feelings such a direct attack on her great article of exportation. England is accustomed to bear these things from the United States, but France cannot afford any meddling or mischief in her wine trade and her tobacco monopoly. M. MERCIER, the energetic and able representative of our ally, is said to entertain strong notions that the contest now waging cannot terminate in the success of the North in what it proposes to itself. M. DE STOECKL, the Russian Minister, who has lived long in America, knows her statesmen and the genius of her people and institutions, and is a man of sagacity and vigorous intellect, is believed to hold similar views. Perhaps the only Minister who has really been neutral, observing faithfully all engagements to actually existing Powers, and sedulously avoiding all occasion of offence or irritability to an irritable people, rendered more than usually so by the evil days which have fallen upon them, is the discreet and loyal nobleman who represents Great Britain, and who is the only one threatened with a withdrawal of pass- ports and all sorts of pains and penalties for the presumed hostility of his Government to the United States. The world sees that the North has not treated the Southerners as rebels -- we will not say it has not dared to do so. But the Federalists have treated the Confederates up to this moment as belligerents. Rebels are hanged, imprisoned, and shot at discretion. Their flags are not received; the exchange of prisoners with rebels is ridiculous. A regular "blockade" of rebel ports is quite anomalous. It remains to be seen, after Mr. DAVIS' recent hints, what the Government dares to do in the case of the "pirates" whom its cruisers caught in the act, red-handed, of privateering piracy. Meantime the arm raised to chastise and subdue has been struck down, and the attitude of the North is just now defensive. There will be on the part of the one people whom the American Press has most insulted and abused every disposition to give fair play and to listen to the call for "tune.'" But the quarrel must have its limits -- the time must be fixed, and the sponge must be thrown up if one or other of the combatants cannot "come up" to it; nor does it seem a case in which any amount of "judicious bottle-holding" can prolong the fight. Now, at the present moment the North is less able to go into the contest than she was a month ago. She has suffered a defeat, she has lost morale and materiel. Besides killed, wounded and prisoners, cannon, arms, baggage, she has lost an army of three-months men, who have marched away to their homes at the very moment the Capital was in the greatest danger. Up to this period the reinforcements received do not bring up the Federalists to the strength they had before the fight. No one can or will tell how many have strayed away and gone off from their regiments since they returned to the camps here, but the actual number of men who have come here are less than those who have gone away home by fully 8,000 rank and file. And the change has been by no means for the better. The three-months men at least had been three months under arms. They were probably at least as martial and as ready to fight as the rest of their people. Just as they are most required and likely not to be quite unserviceable, they retire to recive ill-deserved and ridiculous ovations, as though they had been glorious conquerors and patriots, instead of being broken and routed fugitives, who marched off from Washington when it might be expected the enemy were advancing against it. In their place come levies who have not had even the three months' training, and who are not as well equipped, so far as I can see, as their predecessors, to face men who are elated with success, and the prestige of the first battle gained, and to be associated with regiments cowed, probably, and certainly in some instances demoralized, by defeat. The artillerymen who cut the traces of their horses from caisson and carriage at least knew more about guns than the men who will be put to the new field batteries which Government are getting up as fast as they can; and the muskets, of the best description, left on the field or taken, cannot be replaced for a long time to come. In fact, much of this Army must be reorganized in face of an enemy. That enemy is either incompetent or artful; it is quite certain he is not actuated by clemency or a generous pity. Engineers are hard at work strengthening the position on the south bank of the river; but forts do not constitute safety. Without stout hearts behind their lines and breastworks, abattis and redoubts avail nothing. It must be that the Confederates are deficient in the means of transport, or in actual force, to make an attack which is so obvious, if they desire to show the North it is not possible to subdue them. The corps which went from Winchester to Manassas under JOHNSTON is put by the Federalists at 40,000. Let us take it at half the number. BEAUREGARD and LEE are said to have had 60,000 at Manassas including, I presume, the forces between it and Richmond. Divide that again. There were certainly 20,000 between Monroe, the Court and Richmond, of whom 10,000 could be spared; and on the western side of the Capital of the Confederate States there was available at least another corpsby 10,000 or 15,000 more from the South in case of a supreme effort. There seems no reason, not connected with transport, equipment or discipline, whythe Confederates should not have been able last week to take the field with 75,000 men, in two corps; one quite strong enough to menace the force on the right bank of the Potomac, and to hold it in check, or to prevent it going over to the other side; the other to cross into Maryland, which is now in parts only kept quiet by force, and to advance down on Washington from the west and north. In the event of success the political advantages would be very great at home and abroad, and there would be a new base of operations gained close to the enemy's lines, widie the advantages of holding the Potomac and Chesapeake Bay would be much neutralized and finally destroyed. The Navy-yard would fallinto the enemy's hands. Fort Washington would probably soon follow. Fortress Monroe would be condemned to greater isolation. Philadelphia itself would be in imminent danger should the Confederates attempt greater aggression. But, for one, Gen. BEAUREGARD will consent to no plan of operations in which success is not rendered as certain as may be by all possible precautions, and he might not favor a proposal which would lead to dividing an army into two parts, with a river between them and an enemy on each side. Monroe and Hampton, which are the true bases of operations against Richmond, have been weakened to reinforce the Army covering Washington and Harper's Ferry, and yet I doubt if there are on the south bank of the Potomac, at this moment, 40,000 men all along the lines who could move out and offer an enemy battle, leaving any adequate guards in the trenches and garrisons in the t�te du pont and works. The Confederates, as you were informed from the South, have enlisted men to serve for the war, and take no others. The staple of their army will undergo no change, and as it grows older it ought to get better, unless it be' beaten. You will pardon me for referring to a remark in one of my previous letters, that there might be fierce skirmishes, and even sanguinary engagements, between the two Armies, but that these would be followed by no decisive results, owing to the want of cavalry. Strange to say, though the panic and very discreditable rout was caused by alarms of, and might have been prevented by the presence of cavalry, no steps are taken to remedy that great deficiency. The volunteers who were at Manassas will never stand the man on horseback again, and I believe the Confederates are quite aware of their advantage, though they may have had to mourn the loss of many gentlemen who fell during the day. The Northern papers are increasing the amount of butter in proportion as they decrease the losses of their loaves, and they do not appear to perceive that the smaller the latter were the less should be the layer of the former -- for it is no credit to an army to lose its guns, abandon its positions, throw away its muskets, leave its wounded in the hands of the enemy, and run some thirty and odd miles from front of Centreville, not merely to Arlington, but to Washington, without any cause at all; for without loss there was no cause of retreat, and therefore no excuse for panic and rout. Again, they say there was only a portion of their Army engaged. The greater shame for those who were not engaged to run, then. But before the battle, when MCDOWELL's force was enumerated in terrorem at 50,000, it was said fifteen regiments had subsequently joined. Now it is averred only 15,000, 18,000 or 20,000 were in action. What on earth were the rest about? And I am obliged to say that Mr. DAVIS' statements are quite as startling; for, while he declares the enemy were 35,000 strong, he astonishes us by asserting that of all his host only 15,000 took part in the battle. As to losses, of course it is beyond anything but imagination to give an estimate. Regiments reported to have been annihilated have turned up quite hale and hearty, neat as imported, on the day of marching home -- and fond parents, wives and relatives will he spared many pangs and a great deal of mourning. I think my estimate of I killed and wounded was nearly correct. The prisoners- may amount to more than 900 or 1,000, but the Federalists have lost more heavily than the totals under these heads would show, perhaps. It would be rather ridiculous to call it either a hard-fought, a bloody, or a glorious field; but it was an important one; it was a most trying one to the Federalists, who were badly fed and hard worked, in a waterless country, on a July day, for twelve hours; they were exposed to the demoralizing effects of long-continued artillery fire. In spite of their want of discipline, and the very unaccountable rout, the Federalists at first showed alacrity, but after a time they became torpid and difficult to handle. No one questions the general bravery of Americans, native or adopted, on either side; but a defeat is rendered worse than ridiculous by atttempts to turn it into a triumph. Let the unfortunate brave rest content with the sympathy they deserve, and shun the ovations which are the due of the conqueror. Praise and flattery cannot retake a gun, nor save a standard, nor win a battle -- even if it be from vox populi in Broadway or Bowery.
The Government in some measure let the world see what they think of the charges made against the officers of the Army in reference to the late battle. Here is an order just published:
There will be added to the Department of the Shenandoah the Counties of Washington and Alleghany, in Maryland, and such other parts of Virginia as may be covered by the Army in its operations. And here will be added to the Department of Washington the Counties of Prince George, Montgomery and Freder ick. The remainder of Maryland and all Pennsylvania and Delaware, will constitute the Department of Pennsylvania; head-quarters, Baltimore. The Department of Washington and the Department of Northeastern Virginia will constitute a geographical division under Major-Gen. MCCLELLAN, United States Army; head-quarters, Washington.
All the volunteer regiments will be subject to examination by a Military Board, to be appointed by this-department, with the concurrence of the General- in-Chief, as to their fitness for the positions assigned them. Those officers found to be incompetent will be rejected, and the vacancies thus occasioned will be filled by the appointment of such persons as may have passed the examination before the Board.
By older, L. THOMAS, Adjutant-General.
Yesterday a bill was passed by the House of Representatives imposing a tax on carriages of from $1 to $50; gold watches, $1; silver watches, 50c.; excise on spirituous liquors, 5c. per gallon; and on fermented liquors, 60c. per barrel, or 2c. a gallon. All incomes over $600 per annum, 3 per cent., including money at interest, &c. Every interest in the country is also taxed, including a tax on the net income of the banks, but not on their currency or bank circulation. Landed estates are likewise taxed, and if it be accepted by the other branches of the Legislature, the people of the North will begin to feel that fighting is an expensive luxury, particularly if it be unsuccessful. It will be weeks before we have done hearing and seeing accounts of Bull Run, or, as it may be better called, of Manassas, unless some other action intervenes, as is very likely indeed. Gen. BANKS, not finding any advantage in occupying a point in front of Harper's Ferry, on the Virginia side, has, it is affirmed, withdrawn all his troops to a position in Maryland which commands the passages from the Ferry, and Gen. BUTLER at Fortress Monroe feels himself compelled to abandon his advanced works at Hampton, which I described hurrienly the other day, and to retire to the cover of the guns of the place. Fortress Monroe is quite impregnable to the enemy, for they have not the means of undertaking a regular siege. If they get heavy guns and mortars, however, they can certainly make the interior unpleasant, and should they open trenches the Americans may have a Sebastopol in petto near Old Point Comfort. Meantime the command of Col. PHELPS, at Newport's News, consisting of four regiments, is threatened by the enemy. His camp is intrenched, and furnished with a few howitzers and field-pieces, and heavy guns on the river face. I heard him apply to Gen. BUTLER, when I was there, for horses and harness for his guns, as if he wanted to move them. He is a grim, dour, stern soldier, of the old Puritan type, and if attacked he will defend his camp to the last. Should he be beaten, the Confederates will have both sides of James River. The more closely the consequences of Manassas are investigated, the more serious they seem to be. It must be granted that the Confederates feel their losses more severely than the North does. Their Colonels and ofiicers are men of mark, and even of privates killed or wounded one sees notices implying that they belong to good families, and are well-known people. The O's and Macs and Vons (few of the latter,) the Corcorans, Camerons and Bruggers, prisoners, wounded or killed, are of less consequence to the social system of the North than the Hamptons, Prestons and Mannings are to the South. It Mr. DAVIS and a few of the; leaders were to fall in battle there would be less chance of the South continuing its struggle with the same heart and confidence: but if all the Cabine were to go to-morrow from Washington the spirit of the Northern States would not be diminished one iota. From the South, as yet, we have only a few scattered details of the fight and of its results, but it can be seen that there was no very great exultation over the victory.
The following interesting extracts from the Richmond Enquirer of July 23 will furnish a good idea of the manner in which the news was received:
"FIRST CONGRESS OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA. -- ADJOURNED SESSION.
RICHMOND, Virginia, July 22.
Congress met at 12 o'clock, the Hon. HOWELL COBB in the chair. Prayer was offered by Rev. J. L. BURROWS, of Richmond. The journal of Saturday was read and approved.
On motion, ROBERT E. SCOTT and WALTER PRESTON, of Virginia"; T. M'DOWELL, of South Carolina, newly elected members, came forward and took the oath.
Mr. MEMMINGER, of South Carolina -- Mr. President, I beg leave to interrupt the order of business by bringing to the attention of Congress the intelligence that has been received at this place from the seat of war. I present the following dispatch, which I ask the Secretary to read:
MANASSAS, July 22.
Mrs. JEFFERSON DAVIS : We have won a glorious, though dear-bought victory. Night closed on the enemy in full flight and closely pursued.
JEFFERSON DAVIS.
I beg leave to present an official dispatch received since that :
MANASSAS, July 22.
To Gen. S. Cooper, Adjutant-General, Richmond:
Night has closed upon a hard-fought field. Our forces have won a glorious victory. The enemy was routed, and fled precipitately, abandoning a very large amount of arms, munitions, knapsacks and baggage. The ground was strew for miles with those killed, and the farm-houses and the grounds around were filled with his wounded. The pursuit was continued along several routes towards Leesburgh and Centreville, until darkness covered the fugitives. We have captured several field batteries and regimental standards, and one United States' flag. Many prisoners have been taken. Too high praise cannot be bestowed, whether for the skill of the principal officers or for the gallantry of all the troops. The battle was mainly fought on our left, several miles from our field-works, our force engaging them not exceeding 15,000 -- that of the enemy estimated at 35,000.
JEFFERSON DAVIS.
This announcement, continues Mr. MEMMINGER, informs Congress that the Invader of our soil has been driven back, that our altars have been purified, and our homes secured from the ruthless hand of an unprincipled foe. But, Sir, it has been at a cost that will bring sorrow into many families, wet with burning tears the cheeks of many widows and orphans, and into many happy homes bring, grief and desolation; and I presume; Sir, Congress will be little disposed on such occasion to go on with their usual business. I
have, therefore, taken the liberty of offering a series of resolutions which I will submit to Congress, and ask their adoption:
1. Resolved, That we recognize the hand of the Most High God the King of Kings and Lord of Lords, in the glorious victory with which he has crowned our arms at Manassas, and that the people of these Confederate States are invited, by apppropriate services on the ensuing Sabbath, to offer up their unite thanksgivings and prayers for this mighty deliverance.
2. Resolved, That we deeply deplore the necessity which has washed the soil of our country with the blood of so many of our noble sons, and that we offer to their respective families and friends our warmest and most cordial sympathies, assuring them that the sacrifice made, will be consecrated in the hearts of our people, and will there enshrine the names of the gallant dead, as the champions of free and constitutional government.
3. Resolved, That we approve the prompt and patriotic efforts of the Mayor of the City of Richmond to make provisions for the wounded, and that a committee of one member from each State be appointed to cooperate in the plan.
Resolved, That Congress do now adjourn.
The resolutions were unanimously adopted, and Congress adjourned to meet to-morrow at 12."
It will be observed when Mr. DAVIS telegraphed to his wife, he spoke of a dearly bought victory and a close pursuit. Of the latter there are no evidences; many troops remained till next morning in Centreville, not four miles from the scene of the fight, and Gen. SCHENCK's report states he withdrew his men in good order at his leisure. It will be seen, too, that all which has been said of the enemy outflanking the Federalists' left is rubbish, and that the main contest was, as I stated, on the right of the line. Mr. DAVIS returned by train to Richmond on the 23d a conqueror. His conduct is thus described:
"In response to the calls from the immense crowd who had congregated together to meet him, he alluded to the grand absorbing topic of the day. The enemy, he said, with the taxes they had been imposing on us for twenty years, had fitted out an army on a magnificent scale. They had come over to Virginia with plenty of arms and ammunition, and with ambulances fitted up in such a style of luxury as though they thought they were still taxing the South. They had five or six hundred wagons with them, and provisions of every kind in abundance. In the whole campaign they had over 50,000 men. Their finest parks ot heavy and light artillery are ours. They left everything behind them they could throw away. Among the Federal officers captured is Col. CARRINGTON. Among the Confederate officers killed, unreported, are Lieut.-Col. Johnston, of the Hampton Legion; Col. Thomas, of Gen. Johnston's Staff; and Col. Fisher, of the Sixth North Carolina Regiment. The wounded, unreported, are Col. Stevens, of Gen. Bee's staff; Col. Gartsell, of Georgia; Lieut.-Col. Montgomery Gardner, of the First Georgia Regiment; Col. Nelson, of the Second Virginia Regiment; Col. Jones, of the Fourth Alabama Regiment; Col. Hampton, of the Legion. Col. Preston, of the Twenty-eighth Virginia Regiment, took Col. Wilcox, of Michigan, one captain, and three privates prisoners with his own hands. Edmund Fontaine, Jr., son of Col. E. Fontaine, President of the Virginia Central Railroad, is among the slain."
The "luxury of ambulances" is a new and curious ground of complaint, and I suspect there were not many articles of the kind in rear of the Confederate Army. A propos of this subject, I must remark that one class of officers in the Federal Army did their duty nobly -- the surgeons remained on the field when all others were retiring or had left. One is reported killed; six are prisoners in the hands of the enemy, engaged in attending the wounded of both sides -- an invaluable aid to the scanty Medical Staff of the Confederates. There is no reason to believe the treatment of wounded or prisoners was what it was reported to have been. There may have been some isolated acts of atrocity in the heat of battle or pursuit, and it is only too likely that a building in which wounded men were placed was set fire to by a shell, but it is only justice to the Confederate authorities to say that they seem to have done all they could for those who fell into their hands. Much irritation has been created by the false statements circulated on this subject, and the soldiers on guard over Confederate prisoners here would not permit them to receive some little luxuries which had been ordered by sympathizing inhabitants, on the ground that they did not deserve them after the treatment given by their friends to the Federalists. And as I have used the word "sympathizers," let me add the expression of my belief that there is scarcely a department, high or low, of the public, service of the United States, in which there is not "treason" -- I mean the aiding and abetting the enemy by information and advice. It is openly talked in society -- its work is evident on all sides. I went into the private department of the Post-office the other day, and found there a gentleman busily engaged in sorting letters at a desk. The last time I met him was at dinner with the Commissioners of the Confederate States at Washington, and I was rather surprised to see him now in the sanctum of the Post-office, within a few feet of Mr. BLAIR, of the sangre azul of abolitionism. Said he, "I am just looking over the letters here to pick out some for our Southern friends, and I forward them to their owners as I find them;" and if the excellent and acute gentleman did not also forward any little scraps of news he could collect, I am in error. Again, a series of maps, prepared with great care for the use of Gen. MCDOWELL's Staff, arc given out to be photographed, and are so scarce that superior officers cannot get them. Nevertheless, one is found in a tent of a Confederate officer, in the advance of Fairfax Court-house, which must have been sent to him as soon as it was ready. It is also asserted that Gen. BEAUREGARD knew beforehand of MCDOWELL's advance; but the Confederates left in such haste that much credence cannot be given to the statement that the enemy were fully informed of the fact any considerable length of time beforehand.
The battle having been fully fought and lost, the Federalists are employing their minds to find out why it was fought at all. The convulsions into which the New-York Press has been thrown by the inquiry resemble those produced on a dead frog by the wire of GALVANI. "Who cried 'On to Richmond?"' "Not I, 'pon my honor. It was shouted out by some one in my house, but I don't know who. I never gave him authority. I won't shout anything any more." "Who urged Gen. SCOTT to fight the battle, and never gave anybody any peace till he was ordered to do it?" "Nobody!'' "it was that other fellow." "Please Sir, it wasn't me." "I never approved it." "I'll never say a word to a soldier again." "Mr. President knows I didn't." It is really a most curious study. I begin to think that the best possible instructors may sometimes be in the wrong at this side of the Atlantic. The Tribune declares that Gen. SCOTT, being absolute master of the situation, is responsible for the battle. But the New-York TIMES gives a statement of what took place before the battle at the General's table, which, therefore, is probably published with his sanction, as it is impossible to suppose a gentleman would print it without express permission, from which it would certainly appear that the veteran Commander was not, as I hinted, a free agent in the matter. Here is the statement:
"Gen. SCOTT, it is said, discussed the whole subject of this war, in all its parts, and with the utmost clearness and accuracy. He had a distinct and well-defined opinion on every point connected with it, and stated what his plan would be for bringing it to a close if the management of it had been left in his hands.
The main object of the war, he said, was to bring the people of the rebellious States to feel the pressure of the Government, to compel them to return to their obedience and loyalty. And this must be done with the least possible expenditure of life compatible with the attainment of the object. No Christian nation can be justified, he said, in waging war in such a way as shall destroy 501 lives when the object of the war can be attained at a cost of 500. Every man killed beyond the number absolutely required is murdered. Hence, he looked upon all shooting of pickets, all scouting forays not required to advance the general object of the war, all destruction of life, on either side, which did not contribute to the general result, as so many acts of unjustifiable homicide.
If the matter had been left to him, he said, he would have commenced by a perfect blockade of every Southern port on the Atlantic and the Gulf. Then he would have collected a large force at the capital for defensive purposes, and another, large one on the Mississippi for offensive operations. The Summer months, during which it is madness to take troops south of St. Louis, should have been devoted to tactical instruction, and with the first frost of Autumn he would have taken a column of 80,000 well-disciplined troops down the Mississippi, and taken every important point on that river, New- Orleans included.
It could have been done, he said, with greater ease, with less loss of life, and with far more important results than would attend the marching of an army to Richmond. At eight points the river would probably have been defended, and eight battles would have been necessary; but in every one of them success could have been made certain for us. The Mississippi and the Atlantic once ours, the Southern States would have been compelled, by the natural and inevitable pressure of events, to seek, by a return to the Union, escape from the ruin that would speedily overwhelm them out of it.
'This,' said he, 'was my plan. But I am only a subordinate. It is my business to give advice when asked, and to obey orders when they are given. I shall do it. There are gentlemen in the Cabinet who know much more about war than I do, and who have far greater influence than I have in determining the plan of the campaign. There never was a more just and upright man than the President -- never one who desired more sincerely to promote the best interests of the country. But there are men among his advicers who consult their own resentments far more than the dictates of wisdom and experience, and these men will probably decide the plan of the campaign. I shall do, or attempt, whatever I am ordered to do. But they must not hold irresponsible.
If I am ordered to go to Richmond I shall endeavor to do it. But I know perfectly well that they have no conception of the difficulties we shall encounter. I know the country -- how admirably adapted it is to defence, and how resolutely and obstinately it will be defended. I should like nothing better than to take Richmond. Now that it has been disgraced by becoming the capital of the rebel Confederacy, I feel a resentment towards it, and should like nothing better than to scatter Its Congress to the winds.
But I have lived long enough to know that human resentment is a very bad foundation for a public policy; and these gentlemen will live long enough to learn it also. I shall do what I am ordered. I shall fight when and where I am commanded. But if I am compelled to fight before I am ready they shall not hold me responsible. These gentlemen must take the responsibility of their acts, as I am willing to take that of mine. But they must not throw their responsibility on my shoulders."
It remains to be seen if the plans of Gen. SCOTT can now be followed. The reaction along the Mississippi will be great, and Maj.-Gen. FREMONT, with great respect for his courage and enterprise, is not the man, I fear, to conduct large columns successfully. Missouri is anything but safe; Cairo is menaced, and my friends at Memphis seem to be stirring from their rest under their General.
I regret that I cannot give any more interesting or important intelligence, but I have not been able to go out for the last two days to the camps, as, in common with many people in Washington, I was suffering a little from the weather-thunderstorms, rains, bad, odors, which produce the usual results in garrisons and ill drained cities. However, it is some ,consolation that there is nothing of consequence doing. There was an alarm the night before last. Some foolish people got the loan of a steamer and a big gun, and went down the river with them. When they were opposite one of the enemy's batteries, three or four miles away, they fired their big gun, and "Oh'd," no doubt; at the shot as it splashed short in the water, the enemy treating them with a proper silent contempt all the while. Having done this, they returned in the evening and amused themselves by firing away as hard as they could just below the Long Bridge -- I believe without ball -- and it may be imagined there was some commotion, as the reports shook doors and windows. Gen. MCCLELLAN is doing his best to get things into order, and the outskirts of the city and the streets are quieter at night: but there is rough work with Zouaves and others in Alexandria -- houses burnt, people shot, and such like sports of certain sorts or "citizen soldiery." They will soon be shouting "Money or blood," if not kept in order and paid. These men form a marked exception to the general behavior of many regiments.