The following is transcribed from the New York Times, dated March 14, 1862:

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CAPTAIN: The brief telegraphic report, which I gave the 9th inst., is not sufficient to present even the general outline of the battle of Pea Ridge, and with the reports of my Commanders of Divisions, I now submit a more general detail. My pursuit of Gen. PRICE brought me [???] Ark. The entire [???] campaign, from the 20th of January to this time. including the march from Rolla to the Boston Mount [???] 240 miles, was attended with continual exhibition as of [???] privations, conflict and gallantry, some of which I have telegraphed to headquarters, and may hereafter deserve more full development. After reaching Arkansas the forces of Gen. PRICE were rapidly reinforced by regiments which had been stationed in Arkansas and the Indian Territory. I therefore expected these combined forces would return upon us to give us battle, and in conformity with the orders of the General of the 22d of February, I selected Sugar Creek as the strongest of several strong places taken from the enemy, to make a stand against any and all odds. I reported my force to you on the 12th February, after Col. DAVIS' division had joined me, with 12,095 men and 50 pieces of artillery, including 4 mountain howitzers. My long line of communications required garrisons at Marshfield, Springfield, Cassville and Keitsville, besides a constant moving force to guard more than 10,500, cavalry and Infantry, with 49 pieces of artillery, including the mountain howitzer, one piece haring been sent out into Missouri, and thus prevented from joining us in the battle. The scarcity of forage and other supplies made it neccessary for me to spread out my troops over considerable country, always trying to keep it within supporting distance, convenient to rally on the positions selected for battle. On the 4th of March this force was located as follows: The First and Second Divisions, under Generals SIGEL and [???] were four miles southwest of Bentonville,at Cooper's Farm under general orders to move round to Sugar Creek, about fourteen miles east. The Third Division, under Col. JEFFERSON C. DAVIS, Acting Brigadier-General, had moved and taken position at Sugar Creek, under orders to make some preparatory arrangements and examinations for a stand against the enemy. The Fourth Division was at Cross Hollows, under command of Col. E.A. CARR, acting Brigadier-General. My own headquarters were also at this place, within about twelve miles from Sugar Creek, on the main telegraph road from Springfield to Fayetteville. Large detachments had been sent out from those several camps for forage and information -- one from Cross Hollows to Huntsville, under command of Col. VANDEVER, and three from Cooper's Farm to Maysville and Pinesville. One of those, under Major CONRAD, with a piece of artillery and 259 men, did not reach us till at after the battle. All the others came in [???] and joined in the engagement. The enemy had taken position in the Boston Mountains, a high that range [???] the waters of the White River and Arkansas, Gen. PRICE had rallied the forces that had fought at Carthage, Wilson's Creek and [???] by his exertions to recruit in Misouri during the Winter. On his arrival form Springfield Arkansas, he reported to Gen. [???] that between four and five thousand of these had joined the Confederate service previous to leaving Springfield. The circulation of all manner of extravagant falsehoods on his was induced the whole country to leave their homes; and for fear we would kill them, thousands joined his ranks. Gen. MCCULLOCH brought at least eleven regiments to the field, and Gen. PIKE five. Besides these regularly organized Confederate troops which Gen. PRICE met in Arkansas. there were many companies and regiments of Arkansas volunteers, most of the country people being required to take up arms. From this [???] and the general opinion of the country, I estimated the force of the enemy to have been at least 30 to 40,000. This was the force in and near Boston Mountains, rallying to drive us from Arkansas and Missouri. The two armies thus constituted and located, were within hearing of each other's [???] about thirty miles apart. I submit an a accompanying map, showing some of the topographic features of the country on the roads which we traversed. Our troops were weary and somewhat exhausted in their long, forced marches and frequent conflicts. Our cavalry had especially suttered, in the breaking down and loss of horses. But our troops were generally well armed, drilled, and anxious to encounter the enemy at any reasonable hazard. They were all intelligent, ardent, flushed with our repeated success in many encounters on our way, and all conscious of the righteousness of their country's cause. The arrival of Maj.-Gen. VAN DURN, on the 2d of March, in the camp of the enemy, was the occasion of great rejoicing, and the firing of forty guns. The rebel force was harangued by their chiefs with boastful and passionate appeals, assuring them of their superior numbers and the certainty of an easy victory. Dispatches were published, falsely announcing a great battle at Columbus, Ky., in which had lost three gunboats and twenty thousand men; and thus the rebel horses were [???] he occasion was now open to drive the [???] from the soil of Arkansas, and give a final and successful blow for aSouthern Confederacy. The 5th of March was cold and blustering. The snow fell so as to cover the ground. No immediate attack was apprehended, and I was engaged writing. About 2 o'clock, P.M., scouts and fugitive citizens came, informing me of the rapid approach of the enemy to give battle. His cavalry would be at Elm Springs, some twelve miles distant, that night and his artillery had already passed Fayetteville. Satisfied of the truth of this report, I immediately sent couriers to Gen. SIGEL and Col. VANDEVER, and ordered them to move immediately to Sugar Creek, where I also ordered Col. CARR to move with his division. I also sent you a dispated which may have been lost with other mail matter, which I have since learned was captured by the enemy. I tried you I would give them the best reception possible. All my messengers were successful to delivering their orders. Co. CARR's division moved about 6 P.M. Col. VANDEVER had intelligence of the movement of the enemy before my messenger reached [???] and made immedidiate change in his march, [???] that with great exertion he arrived on the 6th. Gen. SIGEL deferred his match from Cooper's [???] till 2 o'clock in the morning of the 6th, and at Bentonville [???] himself, with a regiment and battery, till he was attacked about 9 A.M. I arrived at Sugar Creek at 2 o'clock A.M. on the 6th, and immidiately detailed parties for early morning work in felling timber to obstract certain roads to prevent the enemy having too many approaches, and to erect field works to increase the strength of my forces. Col. DAVIS and Co. CARR, early in the day, took their positions on the high projecting hills commanding the valley of the creek, leaving the right of the line to be occupied by the first and Second Divisions, which were anxiously expected. The valley of the creek is low, and from a quarter to a half-mile wide. The bills are high of both sides, and the main road from Fayetteville, by Cross Hollows to Keitsville, intercepts the valley nearly at right angles. The road from Fayetteville by Lentonville to Keitsville, is quite a detour; but it also comes up the Sugar Creek Valley; a branch, however takes off, and runs nearly parallel to the main or telegraph road, some three miles from it. The Sugar Creek Valley, therefore, intercepts all these roads. The Third and Fourth [???] before noon of the 6th, deployed their [???] great number of [???] which [???] on the left. [???] the same work to be done on the [???] was in charge of Col. [???] the road which [???] parallel [???] road, to which I have before referred. This proved of great advantage, as it retarded the enemy [???] two hours in their flank movement. Breastworks of considerable length were erected by the troops of the headlands of Sugar Creek, as if by magic, and a battery near the road-crossing, was completely shielded by an extensive earthwork erected under the direction of Col. DAVIS, by a pioneer company commanded by Capt. SNYDER. About 2 o'clock P.M., Gen. ASBOTH and Col. OSTERHAUS, reported the arrival of the First and Second Divisions. This good news was followed immediatelyby another report that Gen. SIGEL, who had remained behind with a detachment, has been attacked nearBentonville, and was quite[???] by the enemy's advance forces. Immediately directed some of the troops to return to his relief, in the meantime, he had advanced with his gallant [???] fighting its way within three or four miles of our main forces.The two divisions turned [???] double [???] and alarge cavalry force also started, all being anxious to join in a rescue of their [???]. Part of the First Division, under Col. OSTERHAUS, soon met the retreating detachment, and immediately opened with artillery and infantry, which cheeked the further advance, [???] the action for the day. In the retreat and final [???] which occupied several hours, [???] loss was some twenty-five killed and wounded. The [???] must have [???] is our artillery had [???] along the road, and the rebel graves in [???] witness of the enemy's loss. The firing having [???] I sent [???] other troops that had joined the movement assignated the positions on the right, which were properly occupied by the First and Second Divisions. Our men rested on the [???] confident of hard work before them on the coming day. The accompanying map of the battle-ground with fully illustrate the positions then and subsequently assumed. On my front was the deep, broad valley of Sugar Creek, forming the probable approaches of the enemy -- our troops, extending for miles, and generally occupying the summits of headlands on Sugar Creek. In my rear was a broken [???] "Pea Ridge," and still further in my rear the deep valley of Big Sugar Creek, or "Cross Timbers." My own [???] and those of Gen. SIGEL, ASBOTH and other commanders of Divisions, were near " Pratt;s House." The [???] the different [???] of the battle. The [???] brought the enemy tomy [???] and [???] of the 5th and above [???] "Pea Ridge" some three miles Northwest of the main telegraph road. I ascertained in the morning [???] this flank movement of the enemy, which [???] was to attack my right flank and rear. I therefore called my Commanders of Divisions together [???] and directed a change of [???] to face the same, upon which the [???] moving. At the same time I directed the organization of a detachment of cavalry and light artillery supported by infantry, open the battle [???] attack from my now center on the probable center of the enemy before be could fully form. I selected Col. OSTERHAUS to lead this central column -- an officer who displayed great skill, energy and gallantry each day of the battle. The change of front thus directed reversed the order of the troops, placing the First and Second Division on the left, their left still resting on Sugar Creek; OSTERHAUS and the Third Division in the center, and the Fourth Division became the extreme right. While I was explaining the proposed movement to commanders, and Col. OSTERHAUS was beginning to rally and more forward his attacking column, a messenger brought me intelligence that my pickets, commanded by Major WESTON of the Twenty-fourth Missouri, had been attacked by infantry. This was at Elkhorn Tavern, where the new right was to rest. Co.. CARR being present, he was ordered to move into position and support the Major as soon as possible. This was the commencement of the second day's fight. It was about 10 1/2 o'clock, and the officers separated, to direct their respective commands. The fire increased rapidly on the right, and very soon opened in the centre. After visiting the right, where I perceived the enemy was making a vigorous attack, and finding Col. CARR under a brisk fire of shot and shell, coolly locating and directing the deployment, I returned to my central position, near PRATT's house, and sent orders to Col. DAVIS to move near to Col. CARR, to support him. In the meantime Col. OSTERHAUS had attacked the enemy and divided his forces, but he was soon pressed with greatly superior numbers, that drove back our cavalry and took our flying battery, which had advanced with it. The Colonel, however, was well supported by his infantry, and soon checked a movement that threatened to intercept the deployment of other forces. I considered the affair so imminent I changed my order to Col. DAVIS, and directed him to move to the support of the centre, which was his proper place according to my order for the change if front. My new line was thus formed under the enemy's fire, the troops generally moving in good order and gallant bearing. Thus formed the line was not continuous, but extended entirely across Pea Ridge, the divisions in numerical order, from left to right, Col. OSTERHAUS remaining in command of a detachment, and operating with Col. DAVIS in resisting MCCULLOCH and MCINTOSH, who commanded the enemy's forces in the centre. I did not err in sending Col. DAVIS to this point, although Col. CARR on the right needed reinforcements. The battle raged in the centre with terrible fury. Col. DAVIS held the position against fearful numbers, and our brave troops nobly stood or charged in steady lines. The fate of the battle depended on success against the flank movement of the enemy, and here near Leetown was the place to break it down. The fall of Gens. MCCULOCH, MCINTOSH and other officers of the enemy, who fell early in the day, aided us in our final success, at this most critical point; and the steady courage of officers and men in our lines chilled and broke down the hordes of Indian cavalry and infantry that were arrayed against us. While the battle thus raged in the centre, the right wing was sorely pressed, and the dead and wounded were scattered over the field. Col. CARR sent for reinforcements, and I sent him a few cavalry and my body guard, with the little mountain howitsers, under Maj. BOWEN. These did good service at a most critical period. I urged Col. CARR to stand firm, that more forces could be expected soon. Subsequently Col. CARR sent me word that he could not hold his position much longer. I could then only reply by sending him the order to "persevere." He did "persevere," and the [???] havoc in the Ninth and Fourth Iowa, and PHELPS' Missouri and Maj. WESTON's Twenty-fourth Missouri, and all the troops in that division, will show how earnest and continuous was their perseverance. Seeing no signs of approaching foes by the telegraph road. I sent him three pieces of artillery and a battalion of infantry, of Col. BENTON's command, (part of the third division,) which had been located at Sugar Creek to guard the approaches. Each small accession to the Fourth Division seemed to [???] an overpowering force. As to the left, I was repeatedly informed it stood safe and firm although threatened by the foe. About 2 P.M., my aid. Capt. ADAMS, who had communicated with that wing, informed me that he had just seen Gens. SIGEL and ASBOTH on Sugar Creek, and there was still no attack in that quarter, and no appearance of an enemy. About this time the enemy's forces melted away in the brushy centre, and the fire gradually ceased. Believing the left and centre were no longer menaced, and the enemy was concentrating on the right, I again sent word to Col. CARR that he would soon be reinforced. I had now resolved to bring up the left and centre to meet the gathering hordes near Elkhorn Tavern. To inform myself of the condition of the extreme left, I went in person to that point. On my way I ordered forward the [???] of Col. BENTON's command, three pieces and a battalion, which had remained guarding the crossing of the main telegraph road. I found Gens. SIGEL and ASBOTH with the troops on the [???] near the extreme left, where all was quiet, and the men, not having been under fire, fresh and anxious to participate in the fight. It was now safe to make a new change of front so as to face Sugar Creek. I therefore ordered this force forward. Gen. ASBOTH moved by the direct road to Elkhorn Tavern, and Gen. SIGEL went by Leetown to reinforee DAVIS. If need [???], but to press on to reinforee CARR if not needed in the centre. Both Generals moved promptly [???] Gen. ASBOTH, collecting and moving forward some [???] commands that I found by the way. It must have been near 5 o'clock when I brought the force to the aid of Col. CARR. He had received three or four shots -- one it severe wound in the arm. Many of his field officers had fallen, and the dead and wounded had greatly reduced his force. He had been slowly forced back near half a mile, and had been seven hours under constant fire. His troops were still fiercely contesting every inch of ground. As I came up, the Fourth Iowa was falling back for cartridges, in line, dressing on their colors in perfect order. Supposing, with my reinforcements I could [???] recover my lost ground, I ordered the regiment to face about. Col. DODGE came up, explaining the want of cartridges, but informed of my purpose, I ordered a bayonet charge; and they moved again with steady nerve, to their former position, where the gallant Ninth was ready to support them. These two regiments won imperishable honors. Gen. ASBOTH had planted his artillery in the road and opened a tremendous fire on the enemy at short range. The Second Missouri Infantry also deployed, and earnestly engaged the enemy. About this time the shades of night began to gather around us but the fire on both sides seemed to grow fierce and more deadly. One of my body guard fell dead; my Orderly received a shot, and Gen. ASBOTH was severely wounded in the arm. A messenger came from Gen. SIGEL, saving he was close on the left, and would soon open fire. The battery of Gen. ASBOTH ran out of ammunition, and [???] back. This caused another battery, that I had located on the other side of the road, to follow -- this [???] a want of support. The infantry, however, stood firm, or fell back in good order, and the batteries were soon restored, but the caissons not quite out of each. The artillery firing was renewed, however, and kept up till dark -- the enemy firing the last shot, for I could not find another cartridge to give them a final round; even the little howitzers responded "No cartridges." The enemy ceased firing, and I hurried men after the caissons and more ammunition, meantime I arranged the infantry in the edge of the timber, with fields in front, where they lay on their arms, and held the position for the night. I directed a detail from each company to bring water and previsions, and thus, without a murmur, these weary soldiers lay, and many of them slept within a few yards of the foe, with their dead and wounded comrades scattered around them, [???] silence and [???] soon [???] for the [???] and [???] The [???] on the [???] been [???] and the centre had [???] the [???] from the [???] My only [???] for the [???] the [???] was the new front which it was necessary to form by my weary troops. I directed Col. DAVIS to withdraw all the remainder of his reserve from the centre, and move forward so as to occupy the ground on CARR's immediate left. Although his troops had been fighting hard most of the day, and displayed great energy and courage, at 12 o'clock at night they commenced their movement to the new position on the battle-field, and they too soon rested on their arms. Nothing further had been heard from Gen. SIGEL's command after the message it [???] that he was on or near the left. His detour carried him around a brushy portion of the battle-field that could not be explored in the night. About 2 o'clock he reported at my headquarters with his troops, who, he said, were going to their former camps for provisions. The distance to his camp, some two miles further, was so great that I apprehended [???] in the morning, and urged the General to rest the troops where they then were, at my headquarters, and send for [???] as the other troops were doing. This was readily concurred in, and these troops [???] also for the night. The arrangement thus completed to bring all [???] of my divisions to face a position which had been held in check all the previous day by one. [???] certain of the [???] success on the coming day. The sun rose above the horizon before our troops were all in position, and set the enemy had not renewed the attack. I was [???] ready to open fire on him, as the First and Second Divisions had not yet moved into position. Our troops that night tested on their arms in the face of the enemy. Seeing him in motion I could not brook delay, and the centre under Col. DAVIS opened fire. The enemy replied with terrible energy from new batteries and lines which had been prepared for us during the night. To avoid raking batteries, the right wing fell back in good order, but kept up a continuous fire from the new position immediately taken. The First and Second Division soon got under way, and moved with great [???] to their position on the left. This completed the formation of the line of battle. Is was [???] to the rear of the first, and was quite continuous, much of it on first sound. We then had our [???] before us where we well knew the ground. The broken [???] occupied by him would not admit of easy evolutions to repel such as could be made by us on the open plain. Victory was inevitable. As soon as the left wing extended so as to command the mountain, and rest safely upon it, I ordered the right wing to move forward so as to take position where I placed it the night previous. I repaired myself to the extreme right, and found an elevated position considerably in advance, which commanded the enemy's centre and left. Here I located the [???] battery, and directed the right wing to move its right forward so as to support it, and give directions to the advance of the entire right wing. Capt. HAVDIN soon opened a fire which proved most galling to the foe, and a marker for our line to move upon. Returning to the centre, I directed the First Iowa Battery, under Capt. DAVID, to take position in an open held, when he could also direct a fire on the central point of the enemy. Meantime, the powerful battery of Capt. WHELFLEY, and many more, were bearing on the cliff, pouring heavy [???] through the [???] near the centre, [???] great trees, and scattering death and destruction with tempestuous fury. At one time a battery was opened in front of HAYDEN's Battery, on the extreme right, so near I could not tell whether it was the enemy or an advance of HAYDEN's, but riding nearer, I soon perceived its true character, and directed the First Iowa and the Peoria Battery, Capt. DAVIDSON, to cross fire on it, which soon drove it back to the common hiding-place, the deep ravines of Cross Timber Hollow. While the artillery was thus taking position and advancing upon the enemy, the infantry moved steadily forward. The left wing advancing rapidly, soon began to ascend the mountain cliff, from which the artillery had driven most of the rebel force. The upward movement of the gallant Thirty-sixth Illinois, with its dark-blue line of men and its gleaming bayonets, steadily rose from base to summit, when it dashed forward into the forest, driving and scattering the rebels from these commanding heights. The Twelfth Missouri, far in advance of others, rushed into the enemy's lines, bearing off a flag and two pieces of artillery. Everywhere our line moved forward, and the foe as gradually withdrew. The roar of cannon and small arms was continuous, and no force could then withstand the converging line and concentrated cross-fire of our gallant troops. Our guns continued some time after the rebel fire ceased, and the rebels had gone down into the deep caverns through which they had begun their precipitate flight. Finally, our firing ceased. The enemy suddenly vanished. Following down the main road which enters a deep canon, I saw some straggling teams and men running in great trepidation through the gorges of the mountain's. I directed a battery to move forward which threw a few shots at them, followed by a pursuit of cavalry, comprised of the Benton Hussars and my escort from Bowen's battalion, which was all the cavalry convenient at the time. Gen. SIGEL also followed in this pursuit toward Keitsville, while I returned, trying to check a movement which led my forces north, where I was confident a frightened foe was not likely to go. I soon found the rebel forces had divided and gone in every direction, but it was several hours before I learned that the main force, after entering the cation, had turned short to the right, following ravines which led into the Huntsville road in a due south direction. Gen. SIGIL followed some miles north toward Keitsville, firing on the retreating force that ran away. Col. BUSSEY, with cavalry and the little howitzers, followed beyond Bentonville. I camped on the field and made provision for burying the dead and care of the wounded. The loss in the several divisions was as follows: Commanded by First Division, Gen. SigeL...... 4 2 11 89 38 144 Second Division, Gen. Ashboth.3 3 17 60 36 119 Third Division, Col. Davis......4 18 42 256 9 329 Fourth Division, Col. Carr......6 29 2 95 491 78 701 Third Iowa Cav., Col. Bussey.. 1 24 18 9 52 Bowen's Battery, Maj. Bowen.. 1 1 2 2 6 1,351 This sad reckoning shows where the long-continued fire was borne; and where the public sympathy should be most directed. The loss of the enemy was much greater, but their scattered battalions can never [???] a correct report of their killed and wounded. The reports of division, and other officers of my command, are all submitted with such details as were seen or understood by local commanders. They give interesting incidents and notice many deserving heroes. I mentioned in my telegraphic report of the 9th of March, with high commendations, and I now repeat the names who have done distinguished service. There are my commanders of divisions, Gens. SIGEL and ASBOTH, Col. and Acting Brig-Gen. DAVIS, and Col. and Acting Brig-.Gen. CARR. They commanded the four divisions. I also present commanders of brigades -- Cols. Dodge, Osterhaus, Vandever, White, Schaffer, Pattison and Grewsel. The three first named I especially commend. I also renew the just thanks due to my Staff-Officers, Capt. T.S. MCKINNY, A.A. Adjt.-General, Capt. W.H. STARK, Capt. JOHN AULFEDT, Lieut. J.M. ADAMS, and Lieut. STILT, all Acting Aids. Also, A. HOOPPNER, my only engineer. To these I must now add Maj. BOWEN, who commanded my body-guard, and, with the mountain howitzers, did gallant service in every battle-field in the pursuit, and especially at Pea Ridge. Capt. STEVENS, Lieut. MATTESON and Lieut. CRABTREE, of this battalion, also deserve honorable mention. Maj. WESTON, of the Twenty-fourth Missouri, Provost-Marshal, in camp and in battle did gallant service. Lieut. DAVID, Ordnance-Officer on my Staff, took charge of the First Iowa battery. after Capt. JONES was wounded, and did signal service. I must also thank my commanders of posts, who supported my line of operation, and deserve like consideration, as their duties were more arduous -- Col. Boyd, at Rolla. Col. Wains, at Lebanon. Col. Mills, at Springfield, and Lieut.-Col. Holland, at Cassville. To do justice to all, I would spread before you the most of the rolls of this army, for I can bear testimony to the almost universal good conduct of officers and men who have shared with me the long march, the many conflicts by the way, and final struggle with the combined forces of PRICE, MCCLULOCH, MCINTOSH, and PIKE, under Maj.-Gen. VAN DORN, at the battle of Pea Ridge. I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant, SAMUEL R. CURTIS, Major-General. HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF THE SOUTHWEST, CROSS TIMBERS, Ark., March 1, 1862. Capt. N.H. MCLEAN, Assist. Adjt.-Gen. St. Louis. Mo. Com. Of. Priv. Vols. Killed..... Wounded. Missing... Killed..... Wounded. Missing... Total.....

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