The following is transcribed from the New York Times, dated November 19, 1862:

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WASHINGTON, Tuesday, Nov. 18.

 

The following has been received at the headquarters of the army: HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE MISSISSIPPI, THIRD DIVISION, DISTRICT OF WEST TENNESSEE, CORINTH, Oct. 28, 1862.

 

          MAJOR: I have the honor to submit for the information of the Major-General commanding the district the following: REPORT OF THE BATTLE OF CORINTH. Preliminaries. The rumors which followed the battles of Iuka were that PRICE had marched to the vicinity of Ripley, and was being joined by VAN DORN with all the available rebel forces in North Mississippi, for the purpose of capturing Corinth, or breaking our line of Communication, and forcing us to retreat toward Columbus. These rumors gained strength until the 1st of October, when strong cavalry scouts sent out for the purpose, demonstrated the fact, that the rebels were moving from Ripley via Ruckersville, and the main body was at Pocahontas. The Question, then was where they would strike the main blow? Equally favorably situated to strike either Bolivar, Bethel, Jackson, or Corinth, which would it be? Unfortunately for me, there was no map of the country northwest of this place to be found, therefore I could not tell whether to expect a strong demonstration here to hold us in suspense, while the blow was struck elsewhere, or vice versa. Rumors that the attack was to take the direction of Jackson or Bolivar via Bethel, were so rife, and the fortifications of Corinth were so well known to the rebels, that I had hopes they would undertake to mask me and passing North, give me an opportunity to beat the masking force and out off their retreat. This hope gained some strength from the supposed difficulties of the country lying in the triangle formed by the Memphis and Charleston, the Mobile and Ohio Railroads, and Cypress Creek. To be prepared for eventualities, HAMILTON's and STANLY's Divisions were placed just beyond Bridge Creek, the infantry outposts were called in from Iuka, Burnsville, Rienzi and Danville, and the outpost at Chewalla retired to New-Alexander, and strengthened by another regiment and a battery, early on the morning of the 2d. During that day evidences increased, showing the practicability of the country northwest of us, and disclosed the facts, not before known, that there were two good roads from Chewalla eastward, one leading directly into the old rebel intrenchments, and the other crossing over into the Pittsburgh Landing road. Accordingly the following disposition of the troops for the 3d was ordered at 1/ 1/2 o'clock A.M. of that day. viz; There being indications of a possible attack on Corinth immediately, the following dispositions of troops will be made: Gen. MCKEAN with his Division will occupy the present position. Gen. DAVIES will occupy the line between the Memphis and Columbus Road. Gen. HAMILTON with his Division will take position between the rebel works on the Purdy and on the Hamburg Roads; and Gen. STANLY will hold his Division in reserve at or near the old headquarters of Major-Gen. GRANT. The respective divisions will be formed in two lines, the second line being either in line-of-battle, or close column by division as their circumstance may require. The troops were ordered to move toward their position with one hundred rounds of ammunition, and three days' rations per man, by three o'clock at 8 A.M., These dispositions were made, and the troops, at 9 o'clock on the morning of the 3d, occupied the positions shown on the accompanying map, HAMILTON on the right, DAVIDSON the centre, MCKEAN on the left, with an advance of three regiments of infantry and a section of artillery, under Col. OLIVER, on the Chewalla road, at or near Alexander's, beyond the rebel breastworks. The cavalry were disposed as follows: (See map accompanying Col. WIEGNER's report:) A battalion at Burnsville, one at Honey's mill, on the Jacinto and Corinth road. Col. LEE, with the Seventh Kansas and a part of the Seventh Illinois at Kossuth and Boneyard, watching the rebels' right flank: Col. HATCH and Capt. WILCOX all the east and north fronts, covering and reconnoitering. The reasons for these dispositions flow obviously from the foregoing explanations of our ignorance of the northwesterly approach, and of the possibility that the rebels might threaten us on the Chewalla and attack us by the Smith's Bridge road on our left, or go round and try us with his main force on the Purdy or even Pittsburgh Landing road. THE GENERAL PLAN, Which was explained to the division commanders verbally in the morning, was to hold the enemy at arm's length, by opposing him strongly in any assumed positions, and when his force became fully developed, and he had assumed a position, to take a position which would give us the use of our batteries and the open ground in the vicinity of Corinth, the exact position to be determined by events and the movements of the enemy. Early in the morning the advance under Col. OLIVER found strong indications that the pressure under which he had retired on the 2d came from the advancing foe, and accordingly took a strong position on the hill, near the angle of the rebel breastworks, with his three regiments and a section of artillery. By 9 o'clock the enemy began to press them sharply, and outflank them. Brig.-Gen. ARTHUR, whom I had requested to go to the front, reported widespread but slack skirmishing, and said the hill was of great value to the advancing force. I ordered him to hold it pretty firmly with that view. About 10 o'clock word came that the enemy were pressing the point hotly, and that reinforcements were required, or they must yield the position. Supposing its importance was properly understood, and that it was held in subordination to the general views of its use, which were explained, I directed Gen. DAVIES to tend up from his position two regiments. But it proved that Gen. MCARTHUR had taken up four more regiments from MCKEAN's Division, and was contesting the ground almost as for a battle. It was probably this which induced Gen. DAVIES to ask permission to rest his right on the rebel intrenchments, and to which I consented, adding the verbal order to Lieut.-Col. DUCAT, that he might use his judgment about leaving his present for that position, but in no event must lie cease to touch the left on MCARTHUR's right. The advance was made to the breastwork, as shown on the drawing, but leaving an interval between MCARTHUR's and DAVIES' left. The enemy developed his forces along that line as MCARTHUR retired from his position, which gave the rebels an opportunity to advance behind DAVIES' left, and forced it, after obstinate resistance, to fall back rapidly about a thousand yards, losing two heavy guns. Our troops fought with the most determined courage, firing very low. At 1 P.M., DAVIES having resumed the same position he had occupied to the morning, and MCARTHUR's Brigade having fought a heavy force, it became evident that the enemy were in full strength, and meant mischief. MCKEAN, with CROCKER's Brigade, had seen only skirmishers, there were no signs of any movements on our left, and only a few cavalry skirmishers on our right. It was pretty clear that we were to expect the weight of the attack to tall on our centre, where hopes had been given of our falling back. Orders were accordingly given to MCKEAN to fall back to the next ridge beyond our intrenchments, to touch his right on DAVIES' left; for STANLY to move northward and eastward, to stand in close echelon, but nearer town. Gen. HAMILTON was ordered to face toward Chewalla, and move down until his lest reached DAVIES' right. DAVIES was informed of these dispositions, told to hold his ground obstinately, and then when he had drawn them in strongly, HAMILTON would swing in on their front and rear, and close the day. HAMILTON was carefully instructed on this point, and entered into the spirit of it. Owing to loss of time in conveying orders to Gens. MCKEAN and DAVIES, the orders were less perfectly conformed to, but nothing materially injurious resulted therefrom. But owing to the tremendous force with which the enemy pressed DAVIES back, STANLEY was called with his division, with the batteries, and sent a brigade, under Col. MOWER, to support DAVIES, whose right had at last become hotly engaged. MOWER came up while DAVIES was contesting a position near the White House, and HAMILTON began to swing in on the enemy's flank, across the Columbia Railroad, through a very impracticable thicket, when night closed it and put an end to the operations for the day. The details of the heroic deeds of the, troops of DAVIES' Division, of MCARTHUR's and OLIVER's Brigades, as well as those of SULLIVAN's Brigade, of HAMILTON's Division, will be found in the accompanying sub-reports. THE DISPOSITION FOR THE BATTLE OF OCT. 4. We had now before us the entire array which the rebels could muster in Northern Mississippi, VAN DORN commanding, (PRICE's Army, VAN DORN's Army, VILLIPIQUE's and the remnant of BRECKINRIDGE's Corps.) They were in the angle between the Memphis and Columbus roads. Our left was comparatively free; our right very assailable. They out numbered us probably two to one. THE PLAN was to rest our left on the batteries, extending from Battery Robinette, our centre on the slight ridge north of the house, and our right on the highground, covering both the Pittsburgh and Purdy Roads, while it also covered the ridge roads between them, leading to their old camps. MCKEAN had the extreme left. STANLEY, with his well-tried division batteries, Williams and Robinette, the Memphis Railroad and the Chawalla Road, extending dearly to the Columbus road. DAVIES' tried division was placed in the centre, which was retired, reaching to Battery Powell. HAMILTON's staunch fighting division was on the right, with DILLON's Battery, supported by two regiments, posted on the prolongation of DAVIES' line. The design of Gen. HAMILTON was to use the hill where the batteries stood against an approach from the west, where SULLIVAN found the enemy on the last evening. Against my better judgment, expressed to him at the time, I yielded to his wishes, and allowed the occupation, as described. Early in the evening I called the Chiefs of Divisions together and explained to them their plans, and having supervised the positions, retired at 3 A.M., or the 4th, to take some rest. I was soon aroused by the opening of the enemy's artillery, which be had planted within six hundred yards of Battery Robinette. THE BATTLE. This early opening gave promise of a hot day's work, but the heavy batteries and the Tenth Ohio, placed north of Gen. HALLECK's headquarters, silenced them by seven o'clock, and there was an interval of an hour which was employed in going over our lines. About 9 o'clock the skirmishers, which we had sent into the woods on our front, by their hot firing proclaimed the presence of their forces preparing for the assault. Soon the beads of their columns were seen emerging to attack our centre, on DAVIES first, STANLEY next, and HAMILTON last. The drawing shows these positions, and is referred to for the sake of brevity. I shall leave to pens dipped in poetic ink to describe the gorgeous pyrotechny of the battle, and paint in words of fire the heroes of the fight, the details of which will be found graphically depicted in the accompanying sub-reports. I will only add, that when PRICE's left bore down on our centre in gallant style, their force was so overpowering our wearied and jaded troops yielded and fell back, scattering among the houses. I had the personal mortification of witnessing this untoward and untimely stampede. Riddled and scattered, the ragged head of PRICE's right storming columns advanced to near the house, north side of the square, in front of Gen. HALLECK's headquarters, when it was greeted with a storm ofgrape from a section of IMMEL's Battery, soon reinforced by the Tenth Ohio, which sent them reeling back, pursued by the Fifth Minnesota, which advanced to them from their position near the depot. Gen. SULLIVAN was ordered, and promptly advanced to the support of Gen. DAVIES' centre. His right rallied and retook Battery Powell, into which a few of the storming column had penetrated, while HAMILTON, having played upon the rebels on his right, over the opening, effectively swept by his artillery, advanced by them, and they flea. The battle was over on the right. During all this the skirmishers of the left were moving in our front. A line of battle was formed on the bridge as shown in the drawing. About twenty minutes after the attack on the right, the enemy advanced in four columns on Battery Robinett, and were treated to grape and canister until within fifty yards, when the Ohio Brigade arose and gave them a murderous fire of musketry, before which they reeled and fell back to the woods. They, however, gallantly reformed, and advanced by aim to the charge, led by Col. ROGER's, of the Second Texas. This time they reached the edge of the ditch, but the deadly musketry fire of the Ohio Brigade again broke them, and at the word charge, the Eleventh Missouri and Twenty-seventh Ohio sprang up and forward at them, chasing their broken fragments back to the woods. Thus, by noon, ended the battle of the 4th of October. After waiting for the enemy's return a short time our skirmishers began to advance and found that their skirmishers were gone from the field, leaving their dead and wounded. Having ridden over it, and satisfied myself of the fact, I rode all over our lines announcing the result of the fight in person, and notified our victorious troops that after two days' fighting, two almost sleepless nights of preparation, movements and match, I wished them to replenish their cartridge boxes, haversacks, and stomachs, take an early sleep, and start in pursuit by daylight. Returning from this. I found the gallant MCPHERSON with a fresh brigade on the public square, and gave him the same notice, with orders to take the advance. THE RESULTS OF THE BATTLE, BRIEFLY STATED, ARE: We fought the combined rebel forces of Mississippi, commanded by VAN DORN, PRICE, LOVELL, VILLIPIGUE and RUST in person, numbering, according to their own authority, 38,000 men. We signally defeated them with little more than half their numbers, and they fled, leaving their dead and wounded on the field. The enemy's loss in killed was 1,423 officers and men; their loss in wounded, taking the general average, amounts to 5,692. We took 2,268 prisoners, among whom are 137 field officers, captains and subalterns, representing fifty-three regiments of infantry, sixteen regiments of cavalry, thirteen batteries of artillery, and seven battalions, making sixty-nine regiments, seven battalions, and thirteen batteries, beside separate companies. We took also fourteen stands of colors, two pieces of artillery, thirty-three hundred stand of small arms, forty-five thousand rounds of ammunition, and a large lot of accoutrements, The enemy blew up several ammunition wagons between Corinth and Chewalla, and beyond Chewalla many ammunition wagons and carriages were destroyed, and the ground was strewn with tents, officers' mess chests and small arms. We pursued them forty miles in force, and sixty miles with cavalry. Our loss was only 315 killed, 1,812 wounded, and 232 prisoners and missing. It is said the enemy was so demoralized and alarmed at our advance they set fire to the stores at Tupello, but finding we were not close upon them extinguished the fire, and removed the public stores, except two carloads of bacon, which they destroyed. To signalize in this report all those officers and men whose action in the battle deserves mention would unnecessarily lengthen this report. I must therefore refer to the sub-reports and special mentions, and to a special paper herewith, wherein the most conspicuous, to the number of one hundred and nine, officers and men, are mentioned.

 

(Signed,) W.S. ROSECRANS, Major-Gen.