“Fort Henry occupies a bend in the river which gave the guns in the water battery a direct fire down the stream. The camp outside the fort was intrenched, with rifle pits and outworks two miles back on the road to Donelson and Dover.”

          During the winter of 1861-62, the Tennessee River Expedition was planned by Flag-Officer Foote along with Generals Grant and McClernand. The plan was to attack Fort Henry. In January 1862, ironclads were brought to Cairo, Illinois to prepare them for immediate service. However, only four ironclads were ready for the offensive. On January 29, 1862, Grant requested permission to attack Fort Henry where forces could control both the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers. Grant received permission to attack the next day.

          As for Fort Henry, Lt. Col. Gilmer and Lt. Col. Haynes were in disagreement about the fort. Gilmer found the fort in good condition, but Haynes had a totally opposite opinion. He felt the fort “was untenable, and ought to be forthwith abandoned, first because it is surrounded by water, then cut off from the support of the infantry and was on the point of being submerged; second, because our whole force, artillery, cavalry, and infantry, amounted to over 2,000 men, a whole force inadequate to cope with that of the enemy, even if there had been no extraordinary rise in the river.”

          February 2nd, the fleet left Cairo reaching the Tennessee River that evening. Two days later, the fleet was anchored 6 miles below (north) the fort. A heavy rainfall on the 5th caused the river to rise rapidly. It took everything the crews had to keep the ships anchored and not drifting back towards Cairo. This lowered the morale of the ship’s crew. However, the next morning, February 6th, the crew’s morale was lifted when they saw the enemy’s torpedoes floating down the river. If the river had not risen, the torpedoes would have been a hidden danger.

          On the 6th, about 11am, the flotilla assumed a line of battle. Gen. Tilghman knew he would not be able to successfully defend the fort, but to save the main body, he would have to cause a delaying action for as long as possible.6 At 1145am, the Cincinnati fired the first shot for the flotilla to start the battle. Tilghman waited a few moments for the effect of the enemy’s firing to be felt. At which time, Tilghman ordered his eleven heavy guns to return fire. At 12:35pm, a 24-pounder was blown-up disabling the crew working the gun. About the same time, the 10-inch Columbiad was disabled when the vent became clogged with a broken wire.

          With two big guns out of action, the artillerists became very discouraged and felt they were not doing any damage to the gunboats. Tilghman tried to encourage his men to continue firing, but they were exhausted. Tilghman relieved one of his gun chiefs on a 32-pounder. While firing at the Cincinnati, he saw the enemy breaching the fort in front of his guns. Twenty minutes later, Tilghman waved the white flag. However, it could not be seen with the heavy smoke floating around the fort. He jumped down to man the guns for another ten minutes when his fellow officers suggested he lower the flag.

          As Grant wrote in his official report “Fort Henry is ours. The gunboats silenced the batteries before the investment was completed. I think the garrison must have commenced the retreat last night. Our cavalry followed, finding two guns abandoned in the retreat.”

          The battle lasted two hours and ten minutes. It was the delaying action Tilghman was hoping for to allow nearly 2,500 troops to retreat to Fort Donelson.